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DEFERRED PROSECUTIONS AND CORPORATE GOVERNANCE:
AN INTEGRATED APPROACH TO INVESTIGATION AND REFORM
Lawrence A. Cunningham *

Abstract
When evaluating how to proceed against a corporate investigative target, law
enforcement authorities often ignore the target’s governance arrangements, while subsequently
negotiating or imposing governance requirements, especially in deferred prosecution
agreements. Ignoring governance structures and processes amid investigation can be hazardous
and implementing improvised reforms afterwards may have severe unintended consequences—
particularly when prescribing standardized governance devices. Drawing, in part, on new
lessons from three prominent cases—Arthur Andersen, AIG and Bristol-Myers Squibb—this
Article criticizes prevailing discord and urges prosecutors to contemplate corporate governance
at the outset and to articulate rationales for prescribed changes. Integrating the role of
corporate governance into prosecutions would promote public confidence in prosecutorial
decisions to broker firm-specific governance reforms currently lacking and increase their
effectiveness. The Article, therefore, contributes a novel perspective on the controversial
practice: though substantial commentary urges prosecutors to avoid intruding into corporate
governance, this Article explains the importance of prosecutors investing in it.
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INTRODUCTION
“Prosecutors in the boardroom” is a slogan reflecting an unintended early 21st century
overlap of corporate governance and corporate criminal liability. 1 Although exaggerated, the
phrase reflects how prosecutors increasingly demand corporate governance reforms when
settling criminal cases using deferred prosecution agreements (DPAs). 2 While a growing body of
scholarship seeks to put governance beyond the purview of prosecutors, ousting prosecutors
from the boardroom, 3 this Article explains why prosecutors should consider governance
carefully in determining how to proceed ex ante and articulate rationales for governance changes
in DPAs ex post.
Prosecutorial failure to consider governance ex ante can have adverse consequences,
including activating governance mechanisms not designed to the purpose and imposing on
corporate actors to hastily adopt changes that they would ordinarily evaluate and debate
dispassionately. 4 Subsequent prosecutorial prescriptions of governance changes are rarely the
product of articulated rationales and can seem like ad hoc ransoms or trophies created on the fly
by prosecutors seeking to claim victory. Irreconcilable criticisms result, with many observers
saying that DPAs are coerced extractions of overzealous prosecutors while others say they are
mere whitewash that let corporate crooks off the hook. 5
Prosecutors should publicly articulate the rationales for the governance changes they
propose ex post and that articulation should be based on their assessment of the target’s
governance profile ex ante. Creating such an ex ante profile would involve modest incremental
costs while improving the quality of prosecutorial decisions on how to proceed with a case—
such as whether to seek an indictment, what charges to bring, or whether to settle, and on what
terms. Subsequent articulation of rationales would add substantial systemic benefits by
increasing rationality, building credibility, deflecting criticism and creating a catalogue of
knowledge useful in future prosecutions, regulation and governance design. This Article thus
parts with critics of prosecutors in the boardroom by explaining the value of prosecutorial
investment in corporate governance.
Part I of this Article first defines the concept of corporate governance—with notes on the
governance of other business forms—and then highlights the most important developments of
the corporate governance movement of the past two generations, distinguishing those features
from compliance. While critics allow room for prosecutors to consider compliance in the
1

It also inspired a book title. PROSECUTORS IN THE BOARDROOM: USING CRIMINAL LAW TO REGULATE CORPORATE
CONDUCT (Anthony Barkow & Rachel Barkow eds., 2011).
2
See Brandon L. Garrett, Structural Reform Prosecution, 93 VA. L. REV. 853 (2007); Leonard Orland, The
Transformation of Corporate Criminal Law, 1 BROOKLYN J. CORP. FIN. & COM. L. 45 (2006).
3
E.g., Jennifer Arlen, Removing Prosecutors from the Boardroom: Deterring Crime Without Prosecutor
Interference in Corporate Governance (2011), in PROSECUTORS IN THE BOARDROOM, supra note 1; see also Miriam
Hechler Baer, Choosing Punishment, 92 B.U. L. REV. 578 (2012) (exploring reasons why ex post prosecution rather
than ex ante regulation may occur and suggesting that the effects may leave society worse off).
4
See Harry First, Branch Office of the Prosecutor: The New Role of the Corporation in Business Crime
Prosecutions, 89 N.C. L. REV. 23, 32-58 (2010); see also Samuel W. Buell, Criminal Procedure Within the Firm, 59
STAN. L. REV. 1613 (2007).
5
Compare Richard A. Epstein, Op-Ed., The Deferred Prosecution Racket, WALL ST. J. (Nov. 28, 2006) with Ralph
Nader & Robert Weissman, Letter to Alberto Gonzales (June 5, 2006), available at
http://www.multinationalmonitor.org/editorsblog/?p=30 (July 6, 2006, 15:34 EST) (discussing DPA with Boeing).
The truth, undoubtedly, is somewhere in between.
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exercise of their discretion, this preliminary discussion stresses the importance of addressing
governance, not merely compliance. The well-known story of the 2002 prosecution of the
venerable accounting firm of Arthur Andersen is invoked to illustrate the underappreciated
importance of governance. Many take the lesson of Andersen’s destruction by indictment to
warn against indicting large business organizations. Part I, in contrast, draws the seminal lesson
of Andersen: the prudence of prosecutorial consideration of governance when deciding how to
proceed against a business.
Part II presents an original account of a more obscure but richer story: the 2005
prosecutorial probe into AIG. This explains how AIG’s culpability at the center of the financial
crisis of late 2008 was propelled by prosecutorial failure to evaluate its corporate governance
realities in 2005. Analysis reveals concern that prosecutors fail to appreciate how formal
uniformity in corporate governance regulation masks considerable substantive variation and how
this failure can be costly.
Part III turns conceptual and analytical to explore the relationship between prosecutors
and corporate governance, particularly the proper scope of DPAs. One approach, implicitly
reflected in the status quo, conceives of DPAs as pure contract whose terms are limited only by
standard contract doctrine; a mirror-image conception, critical of current practice, conceives of
DPAs as pure regulation, which limits the range of proper terms to those targeting compliance,
prohibiting broader aspects of corporate governance. A third conception, the most apt,
recognizes DPAs as products of prosecutorial discretion, subject to prosecutorial restraint. In this
view, DPAs warrant an integrated approach covering a wide range of terms, including
governance terms, subject to prudential restrictions: prosecutors should only proffer such terms
when they have assembled a formal governance profile of a target ex ante and publicly explain
the rationale for such terms when announcing DPAs ex post. Benefits and costs are hypothesized
and assessed, lending support to the integrated approach. 6
Part IV returns to concrete ground to offer a series of examples of governance terms
found in DPAs and credible rationales that prosecutors might have articulated. Examples include
terms from the DPA in the case of Bristol-Myers Squibb, which drew sharp criticism, but
prosecutors subsequently published a detailed explanation, 7 illustrating the articulated rationale
this Article prescribes. Appendices excerpt governance terms of the Bristol-Myers Squibb DPA
and related prosecutorial explanations, not so much to assert their optimality or ideality, but to
suggest the feasibility of fulfilling this Article’s prescriptions at reasonably low cost with
valuable payoffs.
This Article concludes that the Department of Justice should lead by updating its
guidelines for federal prosecutions of corporate targets to reflect the integrated approach and
other prosecutors follow the lead. The DOJ has been reluctant to publish guidance on the subject
of corporate governance reforms in DPAs. 8 But this Article urges steps that should be more
6

Costs are discussed infra text accompanying notes 218-221.
Christopher J. Christie & Robert M. Hanna, A Push Down the Road of Good Corporate Citizenship: The Deferred
Prosecution Agreement Between the U.S. Attorney for the District of New Jersey and Bristol-Myers Squibb Co., 43
AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1043 (2006).
8
Compare Written Testimony of Brandon L. Garrett, U.S. House of Representatives, Committee on the Judiciary,
Subcommittee on Commercial and Administrative Law, Deferred Prosecution: Should Corporate Settlement
Agreements Be Without Guidelines? (March 11, 2008) (calling for DOJ to adopt clearer rules or guidance on
corporate governance aspects of DPAs) with DOJ Letter to House Subcommittee (2008) (stating that “performance
measures” in DPAs may be examined over time).
7
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congenial. The first is to add corporate governance as a factor to the existing list of factors
prosecutors are told to consider when evaluating how to proceed with a case. 9 The other, only
slightly lengthier, would direct prosecutors to relate proffered governance reforms to that
consideration in public articulations of their reasoning.
Looking at the same group of about 300 DPAs now in existence, those who seek to oust
prosecutors from the boardroom see frequent and extensive incursions into corporate governance
that must be repelled while those who perceive excessive leniency are eager for greater
prosecutorial inroads into governance. Under the integrated approach, the exact DPA population
or density of governance terms becomes less important than whether there is investigation ahead
of time and an articulated rationale afterwards.
I. CORPORATE GOVERNANCE AND ARTHUR ANDERSEN
Prosecutors must appreciate both the variety of corporate governance, and the varying
governance regimes across different forms of business organization, when deciding how to
proceed in a criminal case against a business and when settling. 10 Instead, they talk in sweeping
vague terms about rehabilitation of corporate cultures—for example, from a “culture of
corruption or criminality” to a “culture of compliance.” 11 This Part defines corporate
governance; highlights the achievements and shortcomings of the corporate governance
movement of the past two generations; and distinguishes governance from compliance. It
concludes by drawing a new lesson from an old story: the 2002 federal indictment of Arthur
Andersen does not necessarily stand for the idea that prosecutors should refrain from indicting
large businesses because doing so presents adverse collateral consequences for innocent
parties. 12 Rather, the seminal lesson is that prosecutors made the mistake of failing to assess or
understand Arthur Andersen and its governance; had they been more careful, they would not
have indicted the firm.
A. Definition and Variability
Corporate governance is a capacious notion applicable to any business organization,
encompassing business purpose and the mechanisms within a firm to achieve it. Purposes vary
across companies and any given one may have multiple purposes. A common purpose in the
United States for publicly-traded companies is to maximize stock price and for all companies to
maximize net profits available for distribution to owners. Some companies, such as Ben &
Jerry’s Ice Cream, adopt policies more geared to promoting social objectives, while others, such
9

See infra notes 68 & 264 and accompanying text.
The popular press portrayed prosecutors as anemic in failing to charge individuals or firms with crimes arising out
of the financial crisis of 2008. E.g., Editorial, No Crime, No Punishment, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 26, 2012). Prosecutors
explained that abstinence was not for lack of power but for lack of evidence, with both the DOJ and the SEC noting
that they had conducted in-depth an unhindered investigation into numerous firms, including Goldman Sachs.
11
See Peter J. Henning, Corporate Criminal Liability and the Potential for Rehabilitation, 46 AM. CRIM. L. REV.
1417 (2009); BRANDON L. GARRETT, TOO BIG TO JAIL: HOW PROSECUTORS TAKE ON CORPORATIONS ch. 3
(forthcoming 2013) (draft manuscript on file with author and cited with permission); U.S. Attorney, District of New
Jersey, Press Release, Wright Medical (October 5, 2012) (boasting of inducing target to “implement a compliant
corporate culture”).
12
See infra text accompanying notes 72-89.
10
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as Johnson & Johnson, state corporate purpose as advancing the interests of a list of stakeholders
in given orders, such as customers, employees, communities and shareholders. 13 Greater
variation appears among non-U.S. companies. 14
Organizational arrangements bearing on the pursuit of business purpose address the board
of directors, officers, employees and owners. 15 Terms concern board size and procedures and
director selection and identity; officer functions and reporting protocols and leadership attitudes
and philosophies; and employee training and organizational policies and procedures. Features
include shareholder demographics, such as the degree of ownership by institutional investors and
individual investors; and the firm’s directors, officers and employees. They also include the
characteristics of any controlling shareholder and whether a firm is publicly-traded.
Further delineation of an overall governance profile reaches matters of employee
compensation and morale as well as internal controls, including compliance with law. A
corporation’s regulatory environment can be important too, especially for firms in highlyregulated industries where criminal prosecution—or even indictment—can expose firms to
debarment from government contracts or licenses. Within this framework, governance may
encompass how professional advisors such as auditors and lawyers are recruited, supervised and
paid. Among a potpourri of other attributes of governance are such topics as charitable giving,
political speech and CEO succession. Finally, the subjects of financial reporting and disclosure
are also critical aspects of corporate governance for publicly-traded companies.
Corporate governance therefore includes a wide variety of features. They may be
products of norms, practices, history, culture, contract, bylaw, charter, regulation or statute.
Some features are definite, observable and changeable by law or bargain, such as the type and
number of directors and how employees are trained and paid. Others are more fluid, intangible
and persistent, such as a tone at the top, employee culture and shareholder apathy or activism.
Given such variety within companies, corporate governance changes have vastly different effects
on each company.
Although corporate governance literally denominates governance of the corporate form
of business organization, the concepts and issues apply to other forms of business organization as
well—including partnerships, limited liability companies and others. Ownership and control and
related governance attributes in those forms vary further. For example, partnerships tend to
involve a greater degree of participation in management among the partners and partner capital
investments consist of skills and reputation as well as money.
Understanding what makes a given business organization tick requires a rudimentary
grasp of such governance attributes, including an appreciation that what works for one enterprise
may or may not work for another. As important, developments in the broader field of business
law in recent generations have emanated from the corporate form, especially those associated
with the corporate governance movement.

13

See Lewis D. Solomon, On the Frontier of Capitalism: Implementation of Humanomics by Modern Publicly Held
Corporations: A Critical Assessment, 50 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1625 (1993).
14
See Lawrence A. Cunningham, Commonalities and Prescriptions in the Vertical Dimension of Global Corporate
Governance, 84 CORNELL L. REV. 1133 (1999).
15
See AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE, PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE (1994).
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B. Movement and Power Shifts
Beginning in the 1970s, a corporate governance movement emerged to contend that
corporations should maximize shareholder value. Proponents advocated devices adapted to that
end focused on the role of officers, directors and shareholders. Until then, during most of the 20th
century in America, boards of directors tended to be characterized as a collegial body operating
in an atmosphere of trust and informality. 16 Largely for reasons of historical and political
accident, managers were strong, directors supportive and shareholders, especially in publiclytraded firms, weak. 17 This structure was famously described in the 1930s by Berle and Means as
resulting in the separation of corporate ownership from corporate control. 18
The corporate governance movement, along with a burgeoning scholarly literature,
forged change in the traditional model in the 1970s. Demand for change rose due to a
combination of social, business and legal factors, including corporate scandals that alienated
shareholders, and judicial and regulatory reformers eager for change. 19 For shareholder
advocates, the original goal of this movement was to focus corporations on the purpose of
maximizing shareholder value; in the legal literature, the objective was expressed in terms of
reducing agency costs associated with the separation of ownership from control in publiclytraded corporations. 20 Other proponents stressed broader concerns about civic responsibility. 21
Institutional Investors. The most significant development in the modern history of
corporate governance has been the rise in institutional ownership of corporate stock. 22 Since the
1970s, with increasing ownership through today, a steadily growing percentage of the equity of
large U.S. corporations has come to be owned not by individuals, as historically occurred, but by
institutional investors, such as pension plans, private foundations and mutual funds. 23 These
institutional investors drove the corporate governance movement.
With vast pools of capital, along with associated votes in corporate director elections,
concentrated in fewer hands, shareholders gained greater influence in corporate boardrooms. In
particular, institutional shareholders held out the promise of overcoming the costs of collective
action and the problem of rational apathy that plagued individual shareholders and limited their
power. 24
Active shareholders—such as the California Public Employees Retirement System or
CalPers—succeeded in transforming many aspects of corporate governance. Watershed
accomplishments include the landmark amendments to the federal proxy rules in 1993 that
16

See MYLES MACE, DIRECTORS: MYTH AND REALITY (1971).
See MARK J. ROE, STRONG MANAGERS, WEAK OWNERS: THE POLITICAL ROOTS OF AMERICAN CORPORATE
FINANCE (1996).
18
ADOLPH A. BERLE & GARDINER MEANS, THE MODERN CORPORATION AND PRIVATE PROPERTY (1932).
19
See MELVIN EISENBERG, THE STRUCTURE OF THE CORPORATION: A LEGAL ANALYSIS (1976).
20
See FRANK H. EASTERBROOK & DANIEL R. FISCHEL, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF CORPORATE LAW (1996).
21
E.g., ROBERT A.G. MONKS & NELL MINOW, POWER AND ACCOUNTABILITY (1991).
22
See Marcel Kahan & Edward B. Rock, The Embattled CEO, 88 TEXAS L. REV. 987 (2011).
23
See Gary J. Previts, A Pie Chart View of US Publicly Traded Corporate Equity Distribution: 1950-2011 (slide
show presentation on file with the author); see also Martin Gelter, The Pension System and the Rise of Shareholder
Primacy (draft manuscript 2012, available at www.ssrn.com/abstract=2079607).
24
Directors began to pay more attention to shareholder “voice,” offering shareholders an alternative to the only
traditional way to object to disappointed expectations, which was to “exit,” meaning to sell the stock (once called
the Wall Street rule). Cf. ALBERT O. HIRSCHMAN, EXIT, VOICE AND LOYALTY: RESPONSES TO DECLINES IN FIRMS,
ORGANIZATIONS, AND STATES (1970).
17
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improved the ability of such investors to communicate with one another and plan coordinated
campaigns to advance their corporate governance agendas. 25 Further manifestations include
increased frequency and adoption of shareholder proposals addressed to governance rather than
social issues and expanding shareholder access to the corporation’s own proxy statement for the
election of directors (so-called “proxy access”). 26 Such shareholders also campaigned for
specific corporate governance devices, such as prohibiting the same person from serving as both
board chairman and CEO, holding executive sessions of the board attended solely by outsiders
and imposing age limits for directors.
Outside Directors. But the single greatest consequence of the rise of institutional
shareholders—and the other most significant achievement of the corporate governance
movement—has been the consequent rise in the number and power of outside directors—those
not otherwise employed by or associated with the corporation. 27 Outside directors were seen as a
mechanism for monitoring management and therefore reducing agency costs. 28 They promised a
unique ability to render independent judgments and promote shareholder value. 29
Reinforcing the institutional investor appetite for outside directors, laws and regulations
also increased their number and power. State corporation law in the 1980s encouraged boards to
have outside directors, especially for tasks such as evaluating takeovers and other transactions
posing conflicts of interest. 30 In federal securities law, the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 expanded
the power of outside directors, concerning the auditing function, including giving outside
directors plenary power over the company’s auditor. 31 The Dodd-Frank Act of 2010 created
similar requirements concerning compensation committees. 32 As a result of institutional
shareholder preferences for outside directors and regulatory enthusiasm, today’s boards of the
largest publicly-traded corporations often have no more than one or two inside (management)
directors. 33
25

See Jill A. Hornstein, Proxy Solicitation Redefined: The SEC Takes an Incremental Step Toward Effective
Corporate Governance, 71 WASH. U. L. Q. 1129 (1993).
26
See Kahan & Rock, Embattled CEO, supra note 22; Jill E. Fisch, The Destructive Ambiguity of Federal Proxy
Access, 61 EMORY L. J. 435 (2012); Lisa M. Fairfax, The Future of Shareholder Democracy, 84 IND. L.J. 1259
(2009).
27
See Ronald J. Gilson, Reinventing the Outside Director: An Agenda for Institutional Investors, 43 STAN. L. REV.
863 (1991). The concepts of outside and inside directors are vernacular terms whose precise definitions vary with
context but the distinction generally is between directors who are employees of a company (inside) and those who
are not (outside). More particular distinctions attempt to define a notion of “independent” to denominate directors
whose lack of employee or other corporate status enable them to exercise judgments free of conflict of interest.
Specific and varying definitions of director independence appear in such authorities as the federal securities laws,
state corporation laws, stock exchange rules, corporate and board committee charters, corporate contracts and
various law reform documents. See Donald C. Clarke, Three Concepts of the Outside Director, 32 DEL. J. CORP. L.
73 (2007).
28
See John C. Coffee, Jr., Liquidity versus Control: Institutional Investors as Monitors, 91 COLUM. L. REV. 1191
(1991).
29
See Jeffrey N. Gordon, The Rise of Independent Directors in the United States, 1950-2005: Of Shareholder Value
and Stock Market Prices, 59 STAN. L. REV. 1465 (2007).
30
E.g., Weinberger v. UOP, Inc. 457 A.2d 701 (Del. 1983); Paramount Communications, Inc. v. Time Inc., 571 A.
2d 1140 (Del. 1989); Paramount Communications Inc. v. QVC Network Inc., 637 A.2d 34 (Del. 1994); DEL. GEN.
CORP. L. § 144; MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT, § 8.61.
31
Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, § 301.
32
Dodd–Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (Pub. L. 111-203), § 952; see also S.E.C. Rue
10C-1(b)(1)) (implementing the statutory directives as required).
33
See Lisa M. Fairfax, The Uneasy Case for the Inside Director, 96 IOWA L. REV. 127 (2010).
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Gatekeepers. The third most significant development of the corporate governance
movement concerned the role of professional advisors, called gatekeepers. These are participants
in corporate process, traditionally auditors and lawyers, who stake their reputation when
vouching for the validity or integrity of corporate decision-making. 34 In financial reporting, for
instance, auditors attest to the truth and fairness of accounting results, and in raising capital,
lawyers conduct due diligence to assure the legality of the offering and veracity of the issuer’s
descriptions in accompanying offering documents. 35 Though such professionals had been
involved in these transactions throughout the prior century, the corporate governance movement
amplified the importance of their role. 36 In a recent trend, outside directors have retained their
own lawyers to represent them. Historically, outside directors had not hired their own lawyers,
but Sarbanes-Oxley authorized audit committees to do so. 37 A specialty legal practice emerged:
representing outside directors, especially advising on disagreements with chief executives. 38
Shortcomings. There are several shortcomings in these corporate governance
developments. First, it is not always clear that the rise of institutional investors or outside
directors reduced agency costs as much as promised or that many of the other devices do so
consistently. Institutional investors, after all, manage money for others, meaning they are agents
as well for their investors, and those investors face the costs of having those agents manage their
money. The rise in power of institutional investors may have reduced one set of agency costs
while creating another set in its place. Debate contested the net effects. 39 Further, institutional
investors are not homogenous, but vary in such features as relative activism or passivity and
goals, with most stressing shareholder value but many engaging in “socially responsible
investing” that addresses varied objectives such as environmental protection or human rights. 40
Concerning outside directors, empirical research never provided much evidence that their
presence improves shareholder value or corporate performance. 41 Some evidence suggests that
34

Reiner H. Kraakman, Gatekeepers: The Anatomy of a Third-Party Enforcement Strategy, 2 J. L. ECON. &
STRATEGY 53 (1986).
35
See Lawrence A. Cunningham. Sharing Accounting’s Burden: Business Lawyers in Enron’s Dark Shadows, 57
BUS. LAW. 1421 (2002).
36
See Abraham J. Briloff, The Corporate Society: We are In Pari Delicto, 1 J. CORP. L. 457 (1976); Lincoln Savings
& Loan Ass’n v. Wall, 743 F. Supp. 901, 920 (D.D.C. 1990) (Sporkin, J.) Evidence of the importance attached to
the gatekeeping function is clear from the expanding list of professionals who can provide such a service, which
today includes rating agencies, research analysts, D&O insurers and investment banks. See CLAIRE A. HILL & BRETT
H. MCDONNELL, RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON THE ECONOMICS OF CORPORATE LAW (2012) (including pieces about
such gatekeepers by Lawrence A. Cunningham, Jill E. Fisch, Tamar Frankel, Sean J. Griffith, Richard W. Painter
and Frank Partnoy).
37
Proposals to equip outside directors with power to retain independent advisors remained rare even after being
ordained in 1994 by the American Law Institute. ALI, PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE § 3.04 (1994); see
also James D. Cox, Managing and Monitoring Conflicts of Interest: Empowering the Outside Directors with
Independent Counsel, 48 VILLANOVA L. REV. 1077 (2003) (making “modest” proposal that outside directors asked
to approve interested transactions of other directors retain their own lawyer).
38
Among the earliest and most prominent examples of outside lawyers exerting power in the boardroom to oust a
chief executive occurred when Ira Millstein, of Weil, Gotshal & Manges, played that role in 1992’s dismissal of
General Motors CEO Robert Stempel. See John A. Byrne, The Guru of Good Governance, BUS. WK. (April 28,
1997), p. 100; Alison Leigh Cowan, The High-Energy Board Room, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 28, 1992).
39
See Bernard S. Black, Agents Watching Agents: The Promise of Institutional Investor Voice, 39 UCLA L. REV.
811 (1992).
40
See CAROLYN KAY BRANCATO, INSTITUTIONAL INVESTORS AND CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 87 (1997).
41
E.g., Sanjai Bhagat & Bernard Black, The Uncertain Relationship Between Board Composition and Firm
Performance, 54 BUS. LAW. 921 (1999); Sanjai Bhagat & Bernard Black, The Non-Correlation Between Board
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what matters is not so much a board’s independence as its active engagement. 42 There is also
evidence that certain kinds of outside directors improve the performance of certain functions,
such as adherence to accounting requirements. 43 But, clearly, there is a trade-off between the
expertise commanded by inside (management) directors and the independence that outside
directors offer. 44
Debate continues over the exact value of gatekeepers and ways to improve their
effectiveness. 45 An acute case concerns the new practice of outside directors retaining
independent counsel to advise them, especially on disagreements with management. Some
experts see this development as perilous, as it cleaves boards into factions, injects lawyers deeply
into corporate deliberations and compromises the independence of directors when lawyers advise
them of what is best for them personally rather than one is best for the corporation. 46 However,
in some cases outside directors have assumed considerable power and authority in corporate
boardrooms and have been exposed to personal liability—most notably in the cases of Enron and
WorldCom.47
Studies and debate concerning corporate governance features correctly suggest that any
given governance reform, from adding outside directors to having the audit committee supervise
outside auditors, could have differing effects from company to company. 48 Such differences
expose a final weakness about the corporate governance movement: it often advanced reforms
for adoption generally that overlooked variation among companies. 49 That has been especially
problematic concerning governance devices adopted in the aftermath of corporate scandal. 50
Despite broad observable phenomena such as the rise of institutional investors or outside
directors and changeable terms such as the staffing and duties of audit committees, there remains
considerable variation in relevant corporate governance attributes at particular companies. Thus
boards may be required—by law, stock exchange rule or shareholder mandate—to produce
governance guidelines, committee charters or ethics codes, but the resulting products and effects
Independence and Long-Term Firm Performance, 27 J. CORP. L. 231 (2002); Benjamin E. Hermalin & Michael S.
Weisbach, Boards of Directors as an Endogenously Determined Institution: A Survey of the Economic Literature,
FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF N.Y. ECON. POLICY REV. April 2003), at 7.
42
See Ira Millstein & Paul MacAvoy, The Active Board of Directors and Improved Performance of the Large
Publicly-Traded Corporation, Yale School of Management Working Paper No. 49 (1997).
43
See Lawrence A. Cunningham, Rediscovering Board Expertise: Legal Implications of the Empirical Literature, 77
CINCINNATI L. REV. 465 (2008).
44
Id.; Usha Rodrigues, The Fetishization of Independence, 33 J. CORP. L. 447 (2008).
45
See JOHN C. COFFEE, JR., GATEKEEPERS: FAILURE AND REFORM (2006).
46
See, e.g., E. Norman Veasey, Separate and Continuing Counsel for Independent Directors: An Idea Whose Time
Has Not Come as a General Practice, 59 1413 (2004); see also Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr. & Edward B. Rock, A New
Player in the Boardroom: The Emergence of the Independent Directors’ Counsel, 59 BUS. LAW. 1389 (2004)
(offering tepid acceptance of the concept).
47
See infra text accompanying notes 66-70.
48
See Donald C. Langevoort, The Human Nature of Corporate Boards: Law, Norms and the Unintended
Consequences of Independence and Accountability, 89 GEO. L.J. 797 (2001); Jill E. Fisch, Taking Boards Seriously,
19 CARDOZO L. REV. 265 (1997).
49
See Larry E. Ribstein, The Mandatory Nature of the ALI Code, 61 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 984 (1993).
50
See Roberta Romano, The Sarbanes-Oxley Act and the Making of Quack Corporate Governance, 114 YALE L.J.
1521 (2005); Larry Ribstein, Bubble Laws, 40 HOUSTON L. REV. 77 (2003); Stuart Banner, What Causes Securities
Regulation? 300 Years of Evidence, 75 WASH. U. L. Q. 849 (1997). This literature addresses generally-applicable
laws and regulations adopted in response to financial crises, not the individualized setting of DPAs, which differs, as
noted infra text accompanying notes 203-204.

10

are unlikely to be identical at different firms. Indeed, some governance regulations explicitly
recognize that one size does not fit all, as when certain devices are required only of large
companies and waived for smaller ones. 51
LLCs and LLPs. A final notable phenomenon in the development of business law in the
past two generations has been the proliferation of alternative forms of business organization. The
rise of the limited liability partnership and the limited liability company are the most prominent
examples. These trace their origins to the limited partnership and the corporation, respectively,
and are defined by the high degree to which investors in them may enjoy the benefits of limited
liability along with other advantages. At one time, entrepreneurs had to accept trade-offs among
alternative forms of business organization, such as between the limited shareholder liability of
the corporate form that was subject to two levels of taxation or the single taxation of the
partnership that exposed partners to unlimited liability. The rise of these alternative forms has
eliminated such trade-offs, thanks to statutory and contractual innovations that combine the
appealing attributes of historical forms of business organization into modern hybrids.52
Governance features in these new forms of business organization are extensively tailored by
contract and therefore even more variable than the traditional partnership and corporation.
C. Compliance and the Rise of DPAs
The subject of compliance is a narrow component of corporate governance with roots
anchored not so much in the corporate governance movement but in the concurrent
intensification of organizational criminal liability. Although corporate-level criminal liability
was recognized in a famous 1909 case, 53 throughout most of the 20th century, organizational
criminal liability remained relatively rare. During the 1970s, however, an eruption of corporate
scandals inspired law enforcement authorities to strengthen its policing of corporate behavior. 54
The Watergate-induced disclosures of corporate wrongdoing around the world by U.S.
companies, such as the widespread bribery of foreign officials, prompted legislation cracking
down on such practices. 55 Congress strengthened criminal penalties under federal law across
many fields, from antitrust to environmental to securities. Prosecutions ensued against
corporations with household names, such as Drexel Burnham Lambert in finance and Exxon for
the Valdez oil spill.56
Compliance. The general approach held corporations vicariously liable for acts of their
agents taken within the scope of employment. 57 Policing corporate wrongdoing through criminal
51

E.g., Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, § 989G, 103 Stat. 440 (2009) (ddFrank Act relieving internal control audit obligations for certain smaller public companies); Jumpstart Our Business
Act (“JOBS Act”) of 2012, Pub. L. No. 112-106, §501, 126 Stat. 306, 325 (2012) (to be codified at 15 U.S.C.
78l(g)(1)(A)).
52
E.g., LARRY E. RIBSTEIN, THE RISE OF THE UNCORPORATION (2009).
53
New York Central & Hudson River R.R. v United States, 212 U.S. 481 (1909).
54
John C. Coffee, Jr., “No Soul to Damn: No Body to Kick”: An Unscandalized Inquiry into the Problem of
Corporate Punishment, 79 MICH. L. REV. 386 (1981).
55
See Walter Perkel, The Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, 40 AM. CRIM L. REV. 683 (2003).
56
See DANIEL R. FISCHEL, PAYBACK: THE CONSPIRACY TO DESTROY MICHAEL MILKEN AND HIS FINANCIAL
REVOLUTION (1995).
57
More sweeping variations were formulated as well. E.g., United States v. Bank of New England, 821 F.2d 844 (1st
Cir. 1987) (collective knowledge standard: the sum total of employee knowledge across a corporation can be
attributed to it).
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law assumed a more formal dimension with the formation of the U.S. Sentencing Commission in
1987 and the organizational sentencing guidelines it produced over the next few years. 58 This
codified an approach to deterring corporate crime through a calibrated sentencing format. It gave
corporations credit in sentencing for having effective compliance programs in place as well as
cooperating with lawmakers to conduct requisite investigations and assist in resulting
prosecutions. This amounted to a slight shift from the traditional standard of vicarious liability to
a modified duty-based approach to liability. 59 That is, corporate exposure came to hinge on the
relative effectiveness of a corporation’s compliance program. 60
The importance of effective compliance programs became more central to corporate life
after 1996 when the Delaware Court of Chancery announced clear compliance duties of
corporate directors. 61 Drawing in part on the federal organizational sentencing guidelines, that
opinion questioned the continuing soundness of a 1963 Delaware Supreme Court opinion that
limited any such duties to cases where red flags would have stimulated a reasonable director’s
attention. 62 The Chancery opinion said that corporate directors must take reasonable efforts to
assure that the firm maintains effective compliance programs, a stance later validated by the
Delaware Supreme Court. 63
The holding was narrow and arose in the settlement of a derivative suit that required only
assessing whether a settlement was fair. But it spawned extensive commentary and expanded
work for consultants as companies scrutinized internal compliance programs. 64 Scholars,
meanwhile, questioned whether the preoccupation with compliance could produce cosmetic
exercises in window dressing rather than substantive control over internal corporate agents. 65
After all, compliance systems—or governance structures—are rarely effective unless both senior
management and individuals responsible for maintaining them believe in and endorse them.
Employees and other constituents pick up on signals about whether management holds such
commitments or is merely going through the motions.
Enforcement Intensity and Andersen. The era of Enron and Sarbanes-Oxley brought
renewed intensity to corporate criminal law, just as it did to corporate governance. 66 SarbanesOxley, enacted in 2002, defined new crimes for wrongful financial statement certification,
enhanced penalties for other business crimes and directed the Sentencing Commission to assure
optimal approaches to corporate criminal liability. President George W. Bush formed the
58

See Ilene M. Nagel & Winthrop M. Swenson, The Federal Sentencing Guidelines for Corporations: Their
Development, Underpinnings and Some Thoughts About Their Future, 71 WASH. U. L.Q. 205 (1993).
59
See Jennifer Arlen & Reinier Kraakman, Controlling Corporate Misconduct: An Analysis of Corporate Liability
Regimes, 72 N.Y.U. L. REV. 687 (1997).
60
See Jennifer Arlen, The Potentially Perverse Effects of Corporate Criminal Liability, 23 J. LEGAL STUD. 833
(1994).
61
In re Caremark Int’l, 698 A.2d 959 (Del. Ch. 1996).
62
Graham v. Allis-Chalmers, 188 A.2d 125 (Del 1963).
63
Stone v. Ritter, 911 A.2d 362 (Del. 2006).
64
See H. Lowell Brown, The Corporate Director’s Compliance Responsibility in the Post Caremark Era, 26 DEL. J.
CORP. L. 1 (2001); Charles M. Elson & Christopher J. Gyves, In re Caremark: Good Intentions, Unintended
Consequences, 39 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 691 (2004).
65
E.g. Kimberly D. Krawiec, Cosmetic Compliance and the Failure of Negotiated Governance, 81 WASH. U. L. Q.
487 (2003); Lawrence A. Cunningham, The Appeal and Limits of Internal Controls to Fight Fraud, Terrorism,
Other Ills, 29 J. CORP. L. 267 (2004).
66
See Lawrence A. Cunningham, The Sarbanes-Oxley Yawn: Heavy Rhetoric, Light Reform (And It Might Just
Work), 35 CONN. L. REV. 915 (2003).
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President’s Corporate Fraud Task Force within the Department of Justice to fortify this area of
law enforcement. 67 The government’s rationale was outlined in a series of Justice Department
memos “getting tough” on corporate malfeasance, a 2003 version of which stressed “vigorous
enforcement” of law against “corporate wrongdoers.” 68 The focus remained on corporate
compliance programs as the key to optimal deterrence, with a new emphasis on mandatory
cooperation that intensified the internal policing of corporate employees. 69
In response, prosecutors escalated high-profile suits against esteemed corporate directors
and prominent auditing firms. A symbol of the seismic shift in enforcement occurred when 20
directors of Enron and WorldCom paid $31 million out of their pockets, unreimbursed by
insurance or indemnification, to settle suits against them. 70 Whether desirable or not, directors
across corporate America began to fear for their personal liability.
A stunning result of the Enron-era enforcement intensification occurred in 2002 when the
DOJ filed criminal charges for obstruction of justice against the venerable independent
accounting firm of Arthur Andersen, whose Houston office had signed off on Enron’s books.
During the government’s investigation, two senior Andersen employees destroyed drafts of
documents relating to the work. For that, the government indicted the entire firm, then
employing 85,000 and earning billions annually, and won a fine of $500,000. Negotiations
between prosecutors and the firm to avoid that result, by a contractual settlement, failed when the
two could not agree on the firm’s admission of wrongdoing. 71 Though a unanimous U.S.
Supreme Court eventually overturned the firm’s later conviction, by then the prosecutorial
enthusiasm had destroyed the firm. 72
Proliferation of DPAs and Controversy. After Andersen, prosecutors often became
reluctant to indict entire firms that employed large numbers of innocent people, though they
continued to hold that threat over the heads of top corporate officials. 73 Such reluctance led to
67

See http://www.justice.gov/archive/dag/cftf/. President Barack Obama expanded the program under a new name,
the Interagency Financial Fraud Task Force. See http://www.sec.gov/news/press/2009/2009-249.htm.
68
The memos were signed by successive Deputy Attorneys General of the U.S., the first of which issued in 1999.
See Memorandum from Eric Holder, Deputy Attorney General, U.S. Dept. of Justice, to Heads of Department
Components and United States Attorneys, Bringing Criminal Charges Against Corporations (June 16, 1999);
Memorandum from Larry D. Thompson, Deputy Attorney General, U.S. Dept. of Justice, to Heads of Department
Components and United States Attorneys, Principles of Federal Prosecution of Business Organizations (January 20,
2003); Memorandum from Paul J. McNulty, Deputy Attorney General, U.S. Dept. of Justice, to Heads of
Department Components and United States Attorneys, Principles of Federal Prosecution of Business Organizations
(December 12, 2006), www.usddoj.gov.dag/speeches/2--6/mcnulty_memo.pdf; Memorandum from Mark Filip,
Deputy Attorney General, U.S. Dept. of Justice, to Heads of Department Components and United States Attorneys
Principles
of
Federal
Prosecution
of
Business
Organizations
(Aug.
28,
2008),
www.usdog.gov.dag/readingroom/dag/dag-memo-08282008.pdf.
69
See Miriam Hechler Baer, Governing Corporate Compliance, 50 B.C. L. REV. 949 (2009).
70
See Bernard Black, Brian R. Chefffins & Michael Klausner, Outside Director Liability, 58 STAN. L. REV. 1055
(2006).
71
The sticking point was important because the exact admission would influence the Securities and Exchange
Commission’s decision about debarring the firm from auditing public companies—its bread and butter—a concern
over civil consequences of the criminal procedure. See Kathleen F. Brickey, Andersen’s Fall from Grace, 81 WASH.
U. L. Q. 917 (2003).
72
Arthur Andersen LLP v. United States, 544 U.S. 696 (2005).
73
See Elizabeth K. Ainslie, Indicting Corporations Revisited: Lessons from the Arthur Andersen Prosecution, 43
AM. CRIM. L. REV. 107 (2006); Andrew Weissman & David Newman, Rethinking Corporate Criminal Liability, 82
IND. L. J. 411 (2007); James Kelly, The Power of an Indictment and the Demise of Arthur Andersen, 47 S. TEXAS L.
REV. 509 (2006).

13

the proliferation of deferred prosecution agreements (DPAs), in which firms opt for cooperative
settlement, avoiding the feared fate of doom. In DPAs, prosecutors agree with target corporations
(and other organizations or even individuals) to defer or refrain from prosecution in exchange for
the target admitting allegations, paying fines and committing to various undertakings. 74
Corporate undertakings include reforms such as detailed public disclosure of the matter,
enhanced internal compliance programs and top-level governance changes. Terms provide that
prosecution is deferred. However, if the government determines that the target breached, it can
prosecute. At such a time, given the admissions, conviction is potentially certain. 75
DPAs are age-old devices, but have become popular in the U.S. only in the past decade:
barely a couple dozen were ever used before 2003, but nearly 300 have been signed since. 76
During the summer of 2012 alone, federal prosecutors around the country entered into a dozen of
them with various corporate targets. 77 In late 2012, the United Kingdom opted to follow this
American development. 78 Other countries are doing so as well. 79 Nevertheless, while DPAs may
be both popular among prosecutors and some corporations, they are controversial among
scholars and policymakers, provoking negative commentary. 80

74

Technically, prosecutors distinguish between deferred prosecution agreements (DPAs) and non-prosecution
agreements (NPAs) but the distinction is immaterial to the questions addressed here concerning the legitimacy of
including corporate governance terms in any such agreements. NPAs are typically used in cases where no criminal
charges are filed while DPAs are reached to settle filed charges. Court approval is involved in the latter but not the
former case, though little or no judicial second-guessing occurs. See infra text accompanying notes 168-176.
75
DPAs cam resemble structural reform litigation developed through consent decrees in the civil rights area and
resemble contemporary regulatory agency settlements. See Garrett, supra note 2, at 869-874 (noting parallels to and
differences from structural reform litigation evaluated in the landmark work, Abram Chayes, The Role of the Judge
in Public Law Litigation, 89 HARV. L. REV. 1281 (1976)). DPAs invert the consent decree model, however, as they
target private rather than pubic actors and enforce criminal law not civil rights. As for administrative settlements,
apart from the civil/criminal distinction—and related risks of collateral consequences—they more often than DPAs
do not require admissions of facts or guilt and do not routinely entail commitments to reform compliance and
governance. Agencies also bring the expertise of specialists in the substantive field to their task—such as
environmental or health care—while prosecutors tend to be generalists. On the other hand, federal prosecutors, at
least, increasingly coordinate cases with expert administrative colleagues. Coordination sometimes results in
compliance and governance reforms appearing in the civil settlement rather than the DPA. Such reforms draw on
agency guidelines in the relevant regulatory field—yet another difference with the more ad hoc quality that seems to
characterize the DPA population. Even so, the analysis in this Article is intended to provide a useful general
framework for DPAs pursued by all prosecutors, especially criminal (federal, state and local) but civil as well—
possible because of the emphasis on context throughout. See infra text accompanying note 197.
76
A data base of federal corporate DPAs is maintained at the University of Virginia, organized by Professor Brandon
Garrett. See http://lib.law.virginia.edu/Garrett/prosecution_agreements.
77
DPAs are also increasingly used to settle cases against individuals. Examples include the CEO of Monster
Worldwide, who resolved a case against him using a DPA primarily because of unusual medical conditions he faced
and Floyd Landis, an Olympic cycling star accused of doping, who created a legal defense fund that turned out to be
based on misleading statements.
78
See Samuel Rubenfeld, U.K. To Move Forward with Deferred Prosecution Agreements, WALL ST J. (Oct. 24,
2012).
79
See Global Compliance Panel: Insights of Four Former Prosecutors, METRO. CORP. COUNSEL (August 23, 2012).
80
See Joseph Warin, Update on Corporate Deferred Prosecutions and Non-Prosecution Agreements, HARV. CORP.
GOV. BLOG (July 26, 2012), available at https://blogs.law.harvard.edu/corpgov/2012/07/26/update-on-corporatedeferred-prosecution-and-non-prosecution-agreements/ (“More often than not, the narrative surrounding DPAs . . . is
negative”).
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Critics have detected prosecutorial overreaching in certain cases. 81 They say prosecutors
impose terms on corporations rather than enter into good faith negotiations resulting in a
voluntary or more tailored agreement. Critics have inferred this from the inclusion of peculiar
terms, such as requiring donations to be made to causes with which a prosecutor may have a
connection. 82 Others stress that there is simply no objective basis for determining whether DPAs
are effective or their net costs and benefits. 83 A broader critique questions the competence of
prosecutors to propose or negotiate certain terms commonly used in DPAs, which extend from
enhanced internal corporate procedures concerning compliance to personnel changes and other
top-level governance mandates. 84
Several rationales, however, support DPAs. Rationales include avoiding the risk of
adverse collateral consequences of corporate convictions—the so-called Andersen effect. From
the perspective of economic theory, the adverse collateral consequences are essentially negative
externalities, and DPAs are designed to avoid those. On the upside, DPAs are designed to
achieve positive externalities, which arise from their production of general deterrence. DPAs
may be valuable alternatives to criminal convictions or civil regulation when investigations
generate firm-specific information about corporate defects that the agreements can cure. Finally,
both sides may find such a settlement appealing simply to avoid the cost and uncertainty of a
trial. 85
D. Andersen’s Seminal Lesson
A new line of criticism is emerging to challenge the lessons that have been taken from the
Andersen case. The extensive literature routinely repeats that the lesson of Andersen is that
prosecutors should try earnestly to avoid indicting large business organizations because of the
risk of the collateral consequences for innocent people. 86 Prosecutors embraced the point, as the
frequency of prosecution, especially of large business organizations, declined. 87 However, this
“Andersen effect” is not necessarily a valid lesson of Andersen or the most important.
On the contrary, empirical evidence accumulated since Andersen demonstrates that
corporations and other businesses rarely collapse from indictments or face other serious
collateral consequences. For example, recent research identified several dozen indictments of
large public corporations in the past decade; only a handful of the firms failed and the indictment
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Peter Spivack & Sujit Raman, Regulating the “New Regulators”: Current Trends in Deferred Prosecution
Agreements, 45 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 159, 186 (2008); Miriam Hechler Baer, Insuring Corporate Crime, 83 IND. L.J.
1035, 1044–71 (2008); Jennifer Arlen, Removing Prosecutors from the Boardroom, supra note 3; Rachel Barkow,
The Prosecutor as Regulatory Agency, in PROSECUTORS IN THE BOARDROOM, supra note 1.
82
Such criticisms can seem overstated, as discussed in Section IV.B, infra.
83
Kathleen Boozang & Simone Handler-Hutchinson, ‘Monitoring’ Corporate Corruption: DOJ’s Use of Deferred
Prosecution Agreements, 35 AM. J. L. & MED. 89 (2009); U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-10-110, DOJ
HAS TAKEN STEPS TO BETTER TRACK ITS USE OF DEFERRED AND NON-PROSECUTION AGREEMENTS, BUT SHOULD
EVALUATE EFFECTIVENESS 25 (2009). Legislators have taken heed, with bills in Congress proposing standards to
govern DPAs and promote prosecutorial accountability. E.g., H.R. 1947.
84
See Jennifer Arlen, Removing Prosecutors from the Boardroom, in PROSECUTORS IN THE BOARDROOM, supra note
1. Such objections and others are evaluated in Section III.C, infra
85
For additional references to possible rationales for DPAs, see infra text accompanying note 214.
86
See sources cited supra note 73.
87
See Brandon L. Garrett, Globalized Corporate Prosecutions, 97 VA. L. REV. 1775 (2011).
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was not necessarily the cause. 88 Even iconic firms such as Steve Madden’s shoe company and
Martha Stewart’s lifestyles business survived criminal convictions of those people. As a matter
of theory, moreover, there is reason to doubt whether such collateral risks are a sufficient
justification for DPAs as opposed to indictment and prosecution. 89
Overlooked Governance. To add a new perspective to this literature, a more important
lesson of Andersen is how prosecutors failed to assess or understand the firm’s governance,
thereby causing its collapse. Andersen’s salient governance features were those associated with
its form, ownership and management. Andersen was a partnership. Its members owned the firm
and managed it. Many thus had considerable human and financial capital tied to the firm. Threats
to the firm’s survival from an indictment could be expected to induce partner withdrawals,
including flights to peer firms, fueling a self-fulfilling spiral. 90
In contrast, had Andersen been a corporation, owned by diversified outside shareholders
and managed by professional directors and hired officers, a different prediction would have been
warranted. Such groups would have been less dependent on the firm than the partners were and
thus better able and willing to bear the risk of staying the course. Despite the salient features of
Andersen’s governance, however—a partnership owned and managed by its members—the
warnings of an “Andersen effect” that stoked prosecutorial allergies to organizational
indictments spoke of the danger indictments pose for large corporations. 91
As for clients, other aspects of Arthur Andersen’s governance, broadly defined, come
into play. An indictment would prompt federal regulators at the SEC to threaten to debar the
firm’s authority to audit SEC registrants. Even private clients, not needing such SEC approval,
valued Andersen as a partnership of professional accountants and its related reputation that the
indictment threatened. An indictment of such a firm thus seems relatively likely to precipitate
defection, by clients and partners alike. Collateral consequences, ultimately destroying the firm,
were grave for the firm’s vast employee base, innocent of wrongdoing, as well as clients needing
to scramble to retain other auditors.
Governance Matters. The exact risks of indictment and probabilities of adverse collateral
consequences cannot be gauged definitively. Yet the question of adverse collateral
consequences—which DOJ guidelines since Andersen direct prosecutors to study92—requires an
examination of governance features. That is the only way to determine whether the fallout from
indictment will hurt innocent parties who warrant protection—and not every employee or
88

See Gabriel Markoff, Arthur Andersen and the Myth of the Corporate Death Penalty: Corporate Criminal
Convictions
in
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manuscript
2012
available
at
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insufficiency in the economic theory of regulation cannot justify DPAs containing ex post regulatory terms).
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See Jonathan Macey & Hilary A. Sale, Observations on the Role of Commodification, Independence,
Governance, and the Demise of the Auditing Profession, 48 VILLANOVA L. REV. 1167 (2003).
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See sources cited supra note 73.
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See sources cited supra note 68.

16

shareholder group can claim such innocence. The DOJ’s solicitude for such groups is unusual
within criminal law, 93 which ordinarily offers at most pity to the family and associates of
defendants. 94 The DOJ cannot intend its collateral consequences principle to protect such groups
unless they are deemed innocent, and assessing such a question ex ante requires considering
target governance.
Among corporations, distinctions must be drawn between publicly-held and closely-held
firms. These may imply different owner attitudes towards firm wrongdoing and managerial
capacity for it, probative of the degree to which collateral consequences of indictment or
prosecution should be seen as adverse or not. The separation of ownership from control is starker
in the case of a large public corporation, such as Archer Daniels Midland, where shareholders as
a group should be seen as relatively more worthy of protection than shareholders of an equally
large non-public corporation, such as Cargill, where ownership is concentrated in the hands of a
single family. Such differences warrant predicting different reactions to different forms of
prosecutorial pressure and different perceptions of what constitute adverse collateral
consequences.
Among publicly-held corporations, distinctions and related predictions can be drawn on
the basis of such potentially relevant factors as the level and type of shareholder ownership and
its bearing on questions of collective action and rational apathy. The more concentrated the
ownership in fewer hands, and the larger the institutional ownership level, the easier collective
action becomes. Institutional investors should not always be seen as innocent victims but, given
activism and power, be held accountable too. 95
Again, the type of institutional owner matters along with the size of holdings. Wal-Mart,
for instance, is owned 48% by family-controlled Walton Enterprises, an ownership position that
may entail responsibility for criminal conduct at the firm. A shareholder’s investment purpose
may provide prima facie clues about relative culpability or innocence, with long-term investment
outlooks warranting greater respect potentially than short-term arbitrage positions. 96 Similarly,
some investors concentrate investment in a relatively smaller number of firms that enable close
watch and disproportionate gains. 97 Other investors, such as index funds, diversify greatly and
should not be expected to provide similar monitoring and do not benefit as extensively from
wrongdoing. 98
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Among all corporations, those with higher degrees of insider ownership—by directors,
officers and employees—may respond differently and require different treatment than those with
little or no such ownership. In corporations that have substantial employee ownership, as through
employee stock ownership plans, the roles of employee and shareholder combine, so that any
gains from criminal conduct that might accrue to shareholders are enjoyed by those participating
employees. 99 Shareholders owning substantial percentages of a corporation’s stock may indeed
be victims when senior management commit crimes but their ability to elect the board who
appoints such officers negates the claim to innocent victimhood. 100
Besides such factors as type of business organization and shareholder demographics,
prosecutors should consider additional governance details about targets. The most obvious
concerns the special treatment required concerning businesses owned by other organizations—
such as subsidiaries of corporate parents. Evaluating probable culpability and likely collateral
consequences require gauging the norms of governance in such settings and evaluating the
degree to which they are followed. 101
Every governance situation differs somewhat. Prosecutors must therefore follow through
with kindred profiles at target firms specifically researching directors, officers, gatekeepers,
employees and controls. That said, as a further illustration, the next Part’s case study of AIG
begins with a thumbnail sketch of its governance. Prosecutors would have done well to consider
it when targeting AIG and settling using a DPA. Their failure to do so proved disastrous.
II. AIG, OVERSIGHT AND INATTENTION
This Part, an original case study of AIG, 102 first introduces AIG by canvassing some of
its distinctive governance features illustrating the kind of profile useful for prosecutors to
understand at the outset of investigation. 103 It then explains how ignoring or disrespecting those
99
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governance realities resulted in a hasty and costly upheaval that included ousting the company’s
iconic CEO, Maurice R. (“Hank”) Greenberg. It shows how that failure to investigate before
intervening came at a high price with the subsequent discovery of only limited transgressions not
warranting the ouster decision—let alone an indictment. Finally, it shows the perils of
conceiving of corporate governance as a uniform set of off-the-rack devices with no articulated
rationale as new governance at AIG led the company to the center of the 2008 financial crisis.
The basis for two prescriptions emerges: prosecutors should strive to understand corporate
governance when exercising discretion concerning prosecutions of business targets and should
articulate the rationales of governance reforms they proffer when settling cases using DPAs. 104
A. AIG’s Governance Profile
A profile of AIG’s corporate governance highlights factors prosecutors need to
understand when targeting a business organization. Such attributes are important to grasp as they
reflect the inner workings and mechanisms of a company. Along with the personnel involved,
they are what makes the company tick. In this case, readily discernible matters included a
nimble, innovative, employee driven culture with global reach; a diverse shareholder mix that
included heavy insider ownership, considerable retail ownership and a mix of passive and
activist institutional shareholders; deep and longstanding internal control systems; and a fractious
board members debating executive succession planning. A rudimentary grasp of such examples
of a corporate persona would greatly assist a prosecutor looking to formulate a profile to help
make decisions about whether to charge a company or individuals and whether to proceed with
an indictment and prosecution or settle—and on what terms.
Scale. AIG’s foundations were domestic insurance operations assembled in the 1960s by
Greenberg, along with a collection of international insurance businesses created during the
previous five decades by the American international business pioneer, Cornelius Vander Starr.
From 1969 when AIG went public to 2004, the total market value of AIG’s stock rose from $300
million to $180 billion—an increase of approximately 19,000% compared to a 700% increase in
the S&P 500. 105 By then, AIG employed 92,000, earned more than $11 billion annually and
commanded total assets approaching $1 trillion. It was the largest insurance company in world
history.
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Innovative Internationalists. AIG’s culture valued product innovation. The company
pioneered insurance covering armies, kidnapping, oil pipelines and rigs, satellites, shipping, and
other unusual risks, helping American companies expand internationally in the process that
evolved into globalization. In addition, despite its size, AIG fostered this innovation by creating
mechanisms within the company that could quickly respond to a need for new products 106—
even if the need was on the other side of the world. 107 Decades before globalization, AIG opened
markets not only in Mao’s China but also behind the Iron Curtain in the Soviet Union and its
Eastern European satellites during the Cold War; and in Japan, Malaysia, the Philippines and
throughout Latin America, the Middle East and Africa. 108
Employees. AIG’s management cultivated an employee-centric atmosphere, by stressing
mutual loyalty, never leaving any employee behind, whether navigating treachery abroad or
facing personal crises at home. A distinguished cohort among AIG employees were the “mobile
overseas persons” or M.O.P.s. This group did service stints in numerous countries during their
career, as many as 10 to 15, taking two-to-three year terms in each place. Akin to the U.S.
foreign service, they were corporate ambassadors who could troubleshoot the thorniest problem
anywhere in the world.
Employee compensation was long-term, with most payoffs deferred until age 65. In the
corporate restructurings that occurred to take AIG public, one company (Starr International Co.,
abbreviated SICO) that contributed assets to AIG also received shares of its stock. 109 A small
group of Starr’s closest business associates, including Greenberg, owned all the SICO stock,
entitling them to all the AIG shares received in exchange. They decided instead to preserve a
portion of the AIG shares for SICO’s future corporate use. An important use, made over the next
three decades, was providing incentive compensation to AIG managers paid in AIG shares. The
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incentives were long-term: awards were made annually based on the previous two years’
performance but shares did not vest until age 65. 110
AIG did not enter into employment contracts with any employee, from the CEO to
underwriter trainees, as these were not considered necessary for employee security or desirable
from an incentives perspective. Valuing experience highly, AIG eschewed mandatory retirement
for employees and many employees, including senior management, worked into their 70s and
80s.
Shareholders. Many AIG employees were also shareholders with large portions of their
net worth in AIG stock. SICO continued to own a large percentage of AIG’s stock, declining as
AIG grew, through share transfers and dilution, reaching 12% as of 2005. AIG’s other
management-directors owned or controlled substantial shares and the company earned a
reputation as a “core stock holding” for many portfolios, including state pension funds and those
of the proverbial “widows and orphans.” 111 AIG’s size—a market capitalization reaching $180
billion—made it a choice target of institutional investors in the corporate governance movement,
particularly during the push to enable shareholders to nominate directors (the proxy access
movement). 112
Controls. AIG developed sophisticated systems of internal control. These dated to the
1970s when global operations demanded aggregating financial and insurance information arising
from millions of transactions annually in more than 100 countries. AIG established an audit
committee, led by the board members and staffed by senior accounting officials. They divided
AIG’s operational world into 30 reporting regions, appointed controllers of each, and established
foreign and domestic internal auditors to oversee everything. By 1984, AIG won a AAA credit
rating, which enabled it to diversify earnings by expanding into a few other fields besides
insurance. AIG moved into private equity, aircraft leasing, global infrastructure funds and
financial products. The latter, called the FP division, required adding even more elaborate
internal controls because it managed an investment portfolio not subject to maintaining liability
reserves like that of insurance companies must. Several distinct internal groups, as well as the
outside auditor, consistently monitored FP’s risk portfolio. Risk management was part of AIG’s
corporate DNA. 113
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Directors. AIG’s founding corporate board in 1967 included the luminaries who would
spend their careers making it the world’s largest insurance company. Traditional inside directors,
they knew the company and the insurance business well and were world travelers who
understood the demands of building a global financial services company. From 1984, when AIG
listed on the NYSE, stock exchange rules, federal securities law, state court rulings, and
institutional investor advocacy all gradually required or induced AIG to add increasing numbers
of outside directors. 114 By the early 2000s, outside directors comprised a majority of AIG’s
board, which created a culture in which outside directors were newly inspired to challenge
insiders. The traditional mutually supportive and respectful relationship among board members
frayed.
Succession. During the early 2000s, part of AIG’s corporate objectives included planning
for succession. Succession is a challenging process for many corporations, particularly one in
which the leader invested his career and identity in it, as Greenberg had in AIG. 115 Nevertheless,
AIG’s board and Greenberg wrestled with it beginning in 2000, when Greenberg was 75. They
narrowed the potential successors down to two senior managers—both in their early 50s. As of
late 2004, an understanding was reached among Greenberg and the board, that one of those two
would become CEO for a trial period beginning as of the company’s annual meeting in June
2005, while Greenberg remained chairman. Despite the arrangement, some directors worried that
such a transition would result in Greenberg, a formidable figure, overshadowing the CEO-elect.
A faction of outside directors even retained special counsel to advise them on succession.
Conversations were continuing in early 2005 when prosecutors began a probe at AIG.
B. Ex Ante Miscalculation
The 2005 probe into AIG was started by Eliot L. Spitzer, attorney general of New York.
Spitzer made a name for himself investigating prominent companies and people and became
famous for controversial tactics and disrespecting corporate governance realities. 116 For instance,
in 2004, Spitzer aimed at insurance brokers for bid-rigging, filing a civil case against Marsh &
McLennan. He threatened criminal charges against the firm as a bludgeon, to induce its board’s
cooperation in seeking the resignation of its CEO. Spitzer declared that he would not negotiate
with Marsh’s board while the incumbent remained chief executive, forcing his resignation. 117
Spitzer’s ultimatum overstepped prosecutorial bounds into the realm of corporate governance.
Intervention. In February 2005, Spitzer targeted AIG and Greenberg. 118 Some of AIG’s
outside directors were concerned about corporate liability or personal liability, while one faction
riveted on succession. That faction relied heavily on the lawyer they had retained four months
performance would prove dismal during these years leading to the financial crisis of 2008 in which AIG played a
central role. See infra text accompanying notes 265-268.
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earlier. These directors and their lawyer became not merely cooperative, but aligned with
Spitzer. There is no clear record about exactly why they did so, but it shifted the governance
machinery in favor of a more rapid and complete succession than had been agreed.
Through early March, AIG’s auditor was prepared to sign off on the company’s 2004
financial statements. But it soon made a turnabout, again for reasons that are not clear except that
it faced extraordinary pressure—either from the outside director faction, lawyers or
prosecutors—amid great sensitivity given Andersen’s recent collapse. Spitzer raised questions
about AIG’s accounting for a transaction it had made in 2000 with a large reinsurance company
called Gen Re, then notorious for engaging in aggressive reinsurance deals with many other
insurance companies. Though this one with AIG proved trivial as the saga played out over the
next seven years, Spitzer’s questions became ominous threats that drove AIG’s corporate
governance.
On Sunday March 13, before an investigation had been done, AIG’s outside directors
held a special meeting. They debated the risks to AIG of a corporate indictment, shared concerns
about personal liability and addressed the pending succession issue. At that meeting, the auditors
dropped a bombshell, saying they would not certify the 2004 financials unless the board got
Greenberg to resign. Aside from not having done any investigation, the auditors clearly crossed a
line with such a threat.
Spitzer had issued a subpoena requesting Greenberg to testify about Gen Re and other
unspecified matters. AIG’s employment manuals called for employees to cooperate in any
investigation. Such cooperation commitments are now common in corporate employment
manuals, prompted by the credit for cooperation corporations are given under the OSGs and DOJ
practice. One director asked whether Greenberg would answer all of Spitzer’s questions or take
the Fifth. Greenberg explained that Spitzer refused to show him documents or limit the scope of
questioning so that his lawyers adamantly advised taking the Fifth, though he had nothing to
hide. 119 Some directors seemed to believe that taking the Fifth would violate AIG’s employment
manuals, although as a legal and prudential matter such a conclusion is of uncertain validity. 120
At the end of the lengthy meeting, the directors asked Greenberg to resign. Motives were
mixed, however, since no investigation had been made; the decision was taken in the context of
ongoing negotiations over succession; the auditors exerted unorthodox pressure; and no one
knew whether taking the Fifth violated company policy in these circumstances. This was a
manifestation of prosecutorial prerogative conjoined to a new model of corporate governance in
which power had been reposed in outside directors advised by outside counsel and supported by
outside auditors. It showed how the prosecutorial power met a corporate governance struggle that
the prosecutor did not seem to understand.
Investigation. After the prosecutorial intervention in March, an investigation was
conducted during April, May and June by AIG’s auditors and outside counsel. They restated
AIG’s accounting for the previous five years, though the auditor had certified them during that
119
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time. 121 The firms reported regularly to Spitzer, going beyond ordinary cooperation to the point
of aligning their interests with those of Spitzer. 122 The changes cut shareholders’ equity,
cumulatively across five years, by 2.7% in total and net income by 2.1% per year. 123 A
longstanding rule of thumb in corporate accounting treated variations of less than 5% as
immaterial. Although the SEC abrogated that custom in 1999, 124 auditors signed off on reports so
long as they were within 5% of their calculations of a fair financial picture, as AIG’s were. The
changes, moreover, congregated in areas where there had been controversy about the proper
accounting for certain types of transactions and which auditors had debated for years. 125
The restatement did not provide “probable cause” for a criminal case, which was never
filed against Greenberg or AIG. 126 Spitzer filed a civil case against Greenberg, under New
York’s Martin Act, initially based on seven changes reflected in the restatement. He eventually
dropped all claims except for the Gen Re matter and one other issue in a case that continues
unresolved today more than seven years later. 127 Nor did the restatement vindicate the decision
to seek Greenberg’s resignation—if it defined the threshold for determining to oust a CEO, few
CEOs of large public corporations would remain in office for long.
Nevertheless, the restatement, along with Greenberg’s resignation, caused the company’s
stock price to drop dramatically and rating agencies to slash its AAA rating. Immediate direct
costs to shareholders exceeded several billion dollars—an amount greater than the restatement
and punishment to shareholders that suggested prosecutorial confusion about corporate
governance. Worse, AIG settled with Spitzer and other government authorities under a DPA that
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would prove even more costly because of failure to relate its governance terms to AIG’s
governance realities.
C. Ex Post Standardization
After Greenberg’s early resignation, while prosecutors continued to hold the threat of
prosecution over the company’s head, outside counsel negotiated governance reforms with
Spitzer. 128 Drafts of the agreement recited actions already taken, including Greenberg’s
resignation, and prescribed further changes. 129 As part of these governance reforms, the board
opted to separate the roles of the board chairman and CEO. Splitting the functions of CEO from
board chairman had become fashionable, seen by many as a “best practice.” It manifested the
same rationale of prescriptions for adding outside directors, a desire to reduce the boardroom
power of the CEO. At AIG, this separation had little to do with its prevailing governance
realities, and contrasted sharply with the previous succession plan which, while entailing a
separation of those functions, was tailored to the needs of the transition. As will be elaborated
below, three years later, amid the financial crisis of 2008, it became clear that the separation of
functions had failed and the board repealed it.
Off-the-Rack Governance. A pivotal clause in the Spitzer-AIG agreement required the
board to hire a special advisor to identify additional outside director nominees and to prescribe
“best practices” on “governance issues.” 130 That advisor, Arthur Levitt, a former SEC chairman,
directed a list of reforms, all of which were standard terms he said were best practices and all of
which AIG was required to adopt. 131 Along with the ill-fated endorsement of splitting the
identifies of the chairman and CEO, reforms called for adding even more outside directors; 132
holding executive sessions of the board that excluded any management directors; eliminating the
executive committee; imposing mandatory director retirement at age 73; and barring any former
chief executive from serving on AIG’s board. None of these changes had anything particularly to
do with AIG or its needs. In fact, Levitt chose his recommended reforms after consulting
shareholder advocates, corporate governance experts and selected directors 133—but none of
AIG’s management, employees or largest shareholders.
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A telling mismatch between AIG’s realities and Levitt’s changes concerned abolishing
the executive committee. Levitt supported that recommendation by saying that executive
committees are “often a symbol of board cronyism.” 134 This general impression said nothing
about the committee’s quality or value at AIG. It had consisted of Greenberg and four outside
directors, avoiding cronyism, and had a clear business rationale: to enable nimble operations in a
dynamic global environment, reflected in AIG’s entrepreneurial and internationalist culture.
Another ill-suited reform concerned age limits for directors. AIG’s traditional employeecentric philosophy and its reliance on experienced mobile overseas personnel led it to embrace
employees wishing to work beyond traditional retirement ages at other companies. People could
retire at age 65 and many did, but a large number of AIG employees, including many in senior
management and on the board, continued working well into their 70s or 80s. Greenberg, at the
time of his forced resignation, was 79. While age limits for directors were trendy during this
period, with some 40% of Fortune 1000 companies adopting them in response to urgings from
governance gurus such as CalPERS, they were an anomaly at AIG.
Controls. The Spitzer-AIG DPA prescribed and the board adopted a different set of
committees, officers and reporting lines to handle matters of control and compliance. This approach
put form of internal controls above substance, thereby threatening AIG’s rigorous risk management.
For example, controls at FP had been designed to assure that no transaction ever jeopardized AIG’s
AAA credit rating. All transactions were negotiated on the strength of that rating, which enabled
it to assure counterparties of its ability to make good on its obligations at low cost, without
posting collateral or pledging assets. Such controls kept the FP division from taking on too much risk
and saddling the company with debts that would threaten AIG’s insurance businesses.
Employees. More tangible examples of AIG’s transformation concerned the board’s new
practice of giving employment contracts to executives. No AIG employees had ever had
employment contracts, from the CEO to underwriter trainees. Further, AIG adopted new bonus
policies that moved from the long-term orientation of the employee compensation program run
for three decades under Greenberg’s stewardship toward short-term incentives, including at
FP. 135 All these corporate governance changes would change AIG, though not in the ways that
prosecutors or executives would have hoped. Short term incentives, combined with slackened
controls, would prove perilous.
Chaos. In April 2005, FP began writing credit default swaps on increasingly risky pools
of mortgage related debt, called “subprime.” 136 During 2005, FP’s portfolio steadily declined in
quality; it started with a small fraction of subprime mortgage pools and became entirely subprime.137
By June 2007, AIG had written $80 billion of swaps on the riskiest mortgage pools, quintupling its
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2005 position, all un-hedged. Many swaps required AIG to post cash collateral if AIG’s credit rating
fell or the value of covered contracts declined. Following industry practice, AIG subsidiaries
historically lent securities to borrowers in exchange for cash collateral which would be invested
in short-term/low-risk investments to gain modest interest. From 2006 through 2008, AIG greatly
increased these stakes, taking longer-term, riskier assets, including mortgage backed
securities. 138
At the same time, a global financial crisis had been brewing due to a combination of
forces that overheated real estate markets worldwide. 139 During 2007, the U.S. housing market
weakened, contributing to an intertwined series of economic problems that spread globally into a
financial crisis. Mortgage-related assets began to decline in value. From mid-2007 to late 2008,
these problems gathered momentum and amplified worldwide. AIG’s liquidity problems began
to emerge in July 2007 when customers requested it to post cash collateral amid the weakening
market.
AIG faced a growing gap between its duty to return that cash collateral to counterparties
and the fair value of the mortgage securities its insurance subsidiaries bought with it. 140 The
combination of this gap and the escalating collateral calls facing FP squeezed AIG’s liquidity.
But the mounting turmoil escaped the attention of AIG’s senior management and board, as the
company’s internal controls failed. 141 It was not until June 2008 that AIG’s board responded by
asking the CEO to resign and the board chairman to assume the role of CEO as well—repudiating an
important part of the governance reforms begun three years earlier. 142 The repair efforts came too late,
however, as the company sailed into the financial crisis to be taken over by the U.S. government in
September 2008.
Causation, Correlation and Best Practices. One must ask the question of causation
versus correlation: whether the governance changes were a cause of AIG’s role in the crisis or
merely correlated with it. 143 Investigation and testimony point to the changes playing a causal
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role. Forensic reports on the crisis blamed AIG’s role in it on governance, risk management and
internal control problems during 2007 and 2008. 144 Testimonial evidence, from AIG’s general
counsel, not a Greenberg ally, said that after Greenberg left, “no one was in charge.” 145 The type
and scale of practices at FP—and at the insurance subsidiaries—were novel adventures for AIG
inconsistent with its cautious risk management. AIG’s outside auditors discovered the gathering
crisis in February 2008 and wrote to its chairman a scathing critique of top management and the
governance and control environment they had created. 146 The governance prescriptions clearly
had a causal role in AIG’s near-destruction. 147
The case for a causal connection is supported, moreover, by the evidence that the reforms
implemented at AIG reflected an unfortunate tendency among corporate governance experts to
celebrate “best practices.” That can readily lead to believing that certain devices are so appealing
that they are suitable for every company without regard to particular governance realities. Many
of those devices—such as making outside directors dominant on the board, separating the
chairman and CEO roles, abolishing the executive committee, redesigning control oversight by
creating new offices and committees—were put into place at AIG after the Spitzer-led
prosecution, ordained by one considered to be a leading expert on the subject, Arthur Levitt.
But these and other changes—including offering employment contracts with short-term
bonuses and imposing age limits for directors—were implemented at AIG without giving
consideration to its existing corporate governance attributes, including its entrepreneurial culture,
employee-centric philosophy, employee-ownership and long-term incentive program, absence of
employment contracts, strict internal control regimens, and reliance on experienced and engaged
directors.
When evaluating how to proceed against corporate targets, prosecutors, in formal
guidelines and practice, tend to emphasize compliance programs and cooperation. The AIG case
study indicates that such an isolated focus can be perilous. Prosecutors must understand a
corporation’s broader overall corporate governance profile and work within it rather than ignore
it (or try to revolutionize it). The AIG case study suggests the value of prosecutors taking an
integrated approach to corporate governance by considering it from the outset to the end of a
case, including in settlement under a DPA. The next Part pursues this suggestion more
comprehensively.
III. AN INTEGRATED APPROACH
Given the degree of controversy surrounding DPAs, it is tempting to delineate a precise
conceptual model of their legitimacy and prescribe exactly which terms are valid and which
should be seen as off-limits. This Part considers alternatives, ultimately offering not so much a
precise formula as calling for particular explanations of chosen terms based on an initial
144

E.g., Oversight Report: The AIG Rescue, Its Impact on Markets and the Government’s Exit Strategy (Elizabeth Warren,
chair, June 2010).
145
Id. (quoting Anastasia Kelly).
146
See supra note 141; GREENBERG & CUNNINGHAM, THE AIG STORY, supra note 104 (reprinting the notes).
Additional evidence, and another culprit, appears in the failure to detect any problems by an outside monitor
installed at the company in another DPA on an earlier matter. See infra text accompanying notes 263-267.
147
Another hypothesis attributes the problems at AIG in 2008 not to anything that occurred after Greenberg left in
early 2005 but to the complexity (often called “byzantine”) of the company’s structure or practices that existed in
2005 and before. In my research, see supra note 104, I did not find evidence to support that conjecture.

28

investigation. The articulations would then form a body of knowledge providing considerable
systemic advantages for the public and prosecutors alike. Section A explores DPAs in conceptual
and analytical terms to define their proper scope, best seen neither as contract nor regulation but
exercises of prosecutorial discretion. It concludes that such discretion warrants asking
prosecutors to articulate the rationales of governance terms they proffer based on ex ante
investigation. Section B explains the benefits of this approach compared to alternatives and
Section C considers costs and various objections.
A. Conceptualization: Contract, Regulation, Discretion
The following discussion first probes the defining attributes of DPAs and then draws
implications about their proper scope. Alternative conceptions view DPAs as pure contract
(implicitly the status quo view), pure regulation (a stance directly at odds with the status quo) or
as a device derived from prosecutorial discretion (the conception that emerges from the
following analysis as most faithful to reality). To summarize: (a) under the contractual
conception, no terms are off limits and bargains are policed solely by contract doctrines; (b)
under the regulatory conception, the proper terms of DPAs would be exceedingly narrow, given
the superiority of ex ante legislation or administrative rulemaking, putting governance terms offlimits; and (c) under the discretionary conception, the most apt, the range of proper terms is
open-ended, and certainly includes governance terms, but warrants prudential limitation given
broad prosecutorial power and limited judicial review.
1. Pure Contract? The Implicit Status Quo Conception.
Practice. The current practice concerning DPAs implicitly assumes that they are pure
contracts to be governed primarily by contract law. No business organization is obliged to enter
into one. Companies differ in their response to prosecutorial overtures, due to variation among
governance participants such as directors, chief executives, general counsel and outside counsel.
Every case differs due to variables such as the scope of alleged wrongdoing, the relative
difficulty of proof, the costs of defending a case and the risk of losing customers or facing other
constituent defections. Terms are negotiated and defense counsel in particular cases, as well as
the organized defense bar, push back on given terms. As a result, not all DPAs or all terms in
them should be seen as impositions akin to regulation.
Indeed, it seems that details venturing beyond fines and compliance into the deeper
realms of corporate governance are more likely subject to greater negotiation. In any event, both
sides to DPAs find the deals advantageous, each getting and giving something. At minimum,
both sides avoid the costs and risks of a trial. In some cases, companies may find some
governance changes appealing independent of the prosecutor’s presence. Or prosecutors might
propose simply adhering to requirements to which a company is committed, such as to maintain
as many outside directors as applicable stock exchange rules require. 148 Prosecutors may value
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the bragging rights more highly as a way to boost a DPA’s deterrence power. 149 In such cases,
including governance terms in a DPA is an inexpensive way to achieve closure.
Theory and Doctrine. Were DPAs purely contractual, contract theory would be relevant
to the framework for assessing DPAs, and they would presumably pass muster given the
foregoing observations about their features. They would be governed by the general law of
contracts, with policing according to such doctrines as duress, illegal bargain and
unconscionability. 150 That is generally how plea agreements are handled. Courts declare that plea
agreements are simply another form of contract, 151 while appreciating special features emanating
from constitutional protections 152 and recognizing that plea agreements are formed only upon
judicial approval in the settlement of a pending criminal action. 153
In DPAs, the validity of certain terms—such as waivers of attorney-client privilege and
restrictions on reimbursing legal fees—is suspect. In fact, since a federal court ruled that such
terms were out of bounds in a DPA, the DOJ has eschewed them. 154 This sequence of events is
evidence that the contractual conception—and the status quo based on it—has some purchase.
Private parties can obtain judicial review and declarations of lack of enforceability, on the
grounds that some terms constitute illegal bargains. Certainly, it indicates the prospect and
pressure of judicial review and a constraint on the exertion of excessive prosecutorial bargaining
power.
Limits. Yet there are aspects of the DPA process that call the contractual conception into
question. The balance of power in DPA negotiations may heavily favor prosecutors. First,
companies know that an indictment could mean destruction, as in the case of Arthur Anderson.
Second, in many cases, such as with AIG, DPAs are finalized after a firm’s prior leadership has
been removed and the deal is signed by successors happy to cast blame on predecessors.
Furthermore, were contract law to govern DPAs, some unusual provisions would likely
produce results that would surprise participants. For example, absent express language
disclaiming the creation of third party rights, it is possible that shareholders, competitors,
customers and other members of the public may have enforcement rights on corporate breach.
That would be so if a court concluded that the government intended to give such persons the
benefit of the corporation’s promises, 155 which is plausible considering that prosecutors are
charged with representing the interests of the public at large, including all such constituents. 156 If
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this were the case, it would represent an extraordinary alteration of corporate governance
powers. 157
As another example, the power to declare corporate breach of a DPA is often reposed in
the government’s discretion and the government’s remedy on breach is penal—an immediate
suspension of the deferral and proceeding with a case, likely yielding indictment and conviction.
Such a deliberately, and inherently, penal remedy may pose tensions with the compensation
principle of contract remedies, casting doubt on the validity of such a DPA under traditional
contract law principles. 158 Accordingly, it may be difficult both to insist that DPAs are purely
contractual and assume that they are enforceable as written.
Yet, as a further mark of the limits of the pure contractual conception, when corporations
allege breach of DPAs by prosecutors, courts do not automatically invoke contract principles to
evaluate either the claim of breach or remedy. They rather defer to prosecutorial discretion over
such basic matters as whether the government has surrendered contractual rights to pursue an
indictment or not. 159 But the status quo is most objectionable if DPAs are conceived to be pure
regulation, rather than pure contract.
2. Pure Regulation? The Mirror-Image Critique.
DPAs are more akin to regulation than contract when one appreciates the massive
imbalance of bargaining power prosecutors can command over targets. 160 Prosecutors have
extraordinary state powers in the DPA setting, far different in magnitude and type than the
concept of relative bargaining power contemplated in the realm of contract practice. It is not as if
the corporation is negotiating a loan agreement or long-term lease with the chosen one among
many lenders or landlords in the market. It faces a government agent wielding monopoly
power. 161 The DPA is a sword over the corporation’s head. 162 DPAs have other regulatory
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qualities as well, including that violations expose the private party to public criminal law
enforcement sanctions. 163
Ad Hoc Inferiority. Conceived as pure regulation, prosecutorial interventions are ad hoc
solutions to systemic problems better addressed by legislation or administrative rulemaking ex
ante rather than prosecutors ex post. 164 Optimal deterrence is best achieved by inducing
corporations to maintain effective internal policing by adopting ex ante duties—generally
applicable to firms rather than targeted to a particular one. Hence general federal laws (such as
the Organizational Sentencing Guidelines) encourage all companies to maintain effective
compliance programs and specific substantive regulations (such as addressing drug labeling or
money laundering) establish industry-wide or generally applicable duties addressed to all
companies. This value is particularly high when accompanied by articulation of rationales,
whether through legislative history such as committee reports or administrative agency
statements such as those publicized during the course of seeking notice and comment on
proposed regulations. 165
Within such a regime, as a theoretical matter, there is little or nothing left for DPAs to do.
At best, DPAs could contain terms tailored to matters over which such duty-based criminal
liability and general regulation are somehow ineffective. This universe of problems is probably
limited to terms that are designed to reduce the costs of managerial deviation from optimal
policing. That is, they address problems particular firms have, such as when managers face
private incentives to commit crimes. In the vocabulary of corporate law scholarship, these are
collectively called the agency costs of policing. As a procedural matter, laws and regulations
made ex ante command legitimacy by concordance with norms of publication, open government
and access to law. 166
Narrow Scope. Under this conception of DPAs as pure regulation, it may be defensible
for a prosecutor, on an ex post and firm-specific basis, to call for a particular company not only
to maintain an effective compliance program against money laundering say (as all financial
institutions must) but also to engage a special officer whose job is to assure that effectiveness. A
DPA could likewise properly call for an independent monitor to oversee that person or antimoney laundering processes. An additional rule could require that such personnel be authorized
to report directly to the corporation’s board chairman or outside directors. 167
Such arrangements would be defensible attempts to reduce agency costs associated with
internal policing—i.e., managerial incentives to avoid optimal compliance for personal gain. But,
under the regulatory conception, prosecutors should be discouraged from proffering corporate
governance terms that go beyond compliance. Delimiting DPA terms to those addressing agency
costs of policing has some theoretical appeal and offers a way to curtail prosecutorial excesses.
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Yet given contractual features of DPAs, this conception of DPAs as pure regulation is not
entirely faithful to reality.
3. Prosecutorial Discretion: Most Faithful to Reality.
There is a fundamental problem with conceiving of DPAs as pure contracts or pure
regulation or even a hybrid. True, such conceptions may help evaluate the appeal of DPAs or
assess their proper scope, but a more immediate question appears: the legality of a DPA, which is
to say its enforceability in court. From the judicial perspective, the conceptualization of DPAs as
contracts or regulation may be trivial compared to conceptualization of them as products of
prosecutorial discretion.
Limited Judicial Review. Prosecutorial practice and venerated traditions of prosecutorial
discretion put DPAs substantially beyond the scope of meaningful judicial review. An original
rationale for DPAs is to enable handling probable criminal wrongdoing with limited formal
public procedures such as an indictment. True, upon declaration of breach by the government,
the corporation may be able to obtain judicial review. But given the typical terms—government
having power to declare breach and the remedy being proceeding immediately to prosecution on
admitted facts—the corporation will face pressure unique to DPAs.
Consider also the opposite case, of a corporation’s declaration of prosecutorial breach. 168
A corporation may object that the prosecution sought to indict it despite a DPA and the
corporation’s cooperation and compliance, declaring breach and seeking to enjoin the
indictment. But federal courts do not necessarily classify such cases as involving contracts or
regulation, citing prosecutorial discretion. 169
As the Supreme Court has explained, prosecutorial discretion is entailed by constitutional
separation of powers, in which the “executive branch has exclusive authority and absolute
discretion to decide whether to prosecute a case.” 170 A longstanding feature of the separation of
powers based conception of prosecutorial discretion is that the judicial branch generally lacks
jurisdiction to enjoin a criminal prosecution. 171 Narrow exceptions to this jurisdictional limit
concern enforcing government-defendant agreements, but even such agreements are construed
strictly in the light of the constitutional separation of powers. 172
Many object to prosecutorial discretion, of course. Critics claim overreaching due to
biased discrimination, political aspirations, excessive zeal and, for DPAs, intrusion into the
domain of corporate governance. Solutions include constraining prosecutorial discretion by
greater delineation of substantive criminal law or legislative or judicial review of prosecutorial
judgments—or, for DPAs, ruling governance off limits by statute or perhaps strengthening the
role of grand juries in the process. 173 Judicial review may nominally be required of DPAs upon
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execution for technical reasons, 174 but no judge has ever rejected a DPA 175 and many do not even
hold a hearing when asked to review them. 176 A jurisdiction may require prosecutors who
ultimately decide to drop a criminal case to file a written statement of reasons with a court for its
approval. 177
Prosecutorial discretion has staunch defenders as well and even its toughest critics
acknowledge the necessity of some discretion. 178 Legislators and judges seem to appreciate that
too, as they have not interfered significantly with prosecutorial discretion. For DPAs, such
interference would be of uncertain value. It would put judges, individuals with limited
investigative resources and institutional competence, in the difficult position of second-guessing
prosecutors having conducted an investigation and engaged in negotiations with targets.
Drawbacks also include adding a layer of costs. Another important indirect cost: sharing
responsibility with the judicial branch does not stimulate prosecutors to prepare governance
profiles ex post, an important objective of the integrated approach, the seminal lesson of
Andersen and a vital lesson of AIG.
Prosecutorial discretion is a bulwark against excessive disclosure of matters better kept
confidential. Obvious examples concern protecting victims or witnesses and maintaining the
confidentiality of internal investigation and deliberation. Less obvious is how opacity can
usefully obscure law enforcement resource constraints that can undermine deterrence. An
excessively transparent process would reveal resource constraints that may have adverse effects
on the public’s confidence in law enforcement or in its deterrent value. Relative opacity may
offer other benefits such as promoting public confidence in the fairness and efficiency of
criminal law enforcement. 179 When such concerns are not at stake, or are outweighed by other
factors, prosecutors make exceptions, providing written explanations for decision in given
settings, such as declining to prosecute or giving reasons in individual cases. 180
Restraint. The solution becomes prosecutorial restraint, which evidence demonstrates can
be highly effective. 181 For example, evidence drawn from recently-publicized records in several
big-city prosecutors’ offices, such as New Orleans and Milwaukee, includes written statements
of reasons for decisions, including decisions not to prosecute. 182 The reasons given showed
prosecutors making reliable judgments in accordance with law. They lacked the completeness of
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judicial opinions, but the brief statement of rationales demonstrated a pattern of valid reasons at
work, rather than abuses of discretion warranting judicial review or legislative constraint.
In the case of DPAs, a similar exercise, with public statements of the rationales, would be
useful. After all, prosecutors occupy a special position as ambassadors for justice, quasi-judicial
officers, and thus have some duty to look out for the interests of the target corporation and its
constituencies. 183 Important strands of the principle of prosecutorial neutrality direct prosecutors
to act as objective public servants, whose clients are the public, and they do not represent
partisan interests. 184 Just as judicial supervision of unconscionable bargains invokes paternalistic
impulses, prosecutors negotiating DPAs must protect the interests of their counterparties and
must not act arbitrarily. 185
The integrated approach to DPAs is drawn narrowly to minimize infringement on
prosecutorial discretion. The articulation practice addresses only governance terms in DPAs, not
reasons for deferral, fines imposed or admissions obtained. DPAs may be novel and
controversial but those should not necessarily be the tests warranting a call for public
articulation. It is the uncharted territory, and the damage that can be done to large organizations
and related innocents, that prompts this call. 186
No broader call for articulation is warranted. There are many contexts in which scholars
have considered asking for public statements of prosecutorial decision-making. One example
concerns prosecutorial decisions not to file charges—declinations akin to DPAs that some
believe can amount to prosecutorial nullification. 187 A public statement of reasons would address
that concern but also prove burdensome, costly and ultimately unwieldy.
In short, the best way to conceptualize the DPA is not so much as a species of contract or
regulation but as a product of prosecutorial discretion and to think about its proper scope and
limits as such. So conceived, prudential prosecutorial restraint warrants the integrated approach
of asking prosecutors to prepare a corporate governance profile ex ante as part of their
investigation of corporate targets and then publicly articulating the rationales for corporate
governance terms in DPAs when settling cases. Assuming such steps, prosecutors should feel
free to proffer such terms, which would produce considerable net benefits, both systemic and
parochial.
B. Comparative Benefits of the Integrated Approach
This Section probes the comparative benefits of the three conceptions analyzed in the
previous one, showing the net superiority of the integrated approach—that is, the conception of
DPAs as products of prosecutorial discretion and the call for prosecutors to prepare a governance
profile ex ante and articulate rationales for governance terms ex post. Discussion first identifies
advantages of the integrated approach over both the pure contract and the pure regulation
conception; advantages it offers over the pure regulation conception alone; and advantages it
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offers over the pure contract conception alone. (The ensuing Section considers costs and other
potential objections.)
1. Integrated Approach v. Pure Contract and Pure Regulation Conception.
Improved Decision Making. A practical problem with the pure regulation conception’s
barring prosecutors from proffering governance reforms ex post is how it discourages
prosecutors from considering governance ex ante. The pure contract conception creates the same
disincentive for a different reason, signaling to prosecutors that there is no need to give
governance terms any more thought than is given to any term in any ordinary contract. A
primary advantage of the integrated approach is that it would lead prosecutors to invest in
understanding a target’s governance profile, which would improve the quality of their analysis ex
ante and ex post.
All the varied aspects of corporate governance, referenced above in Part I, would be
potentially probative. Prosecutors would include the creation of a basic profile as part of the
initial investigative phase of a case, to be updated throughout, and providing a basis on which to
negotiate DPAs. Such knowledge likely would imply different signals to prosecutors about how
to proceed, as with an indictment or to settle. In some cases, that would lead to eschewing the
DPA in favor of proceeding with an indictment and perhaps trial and conviction. In cases where
settlement is indicated, the ex ante profile would inform prosecutorial judgment about
appropriate changes.
Tailoring. A related advantage of the integrated approach is the opportunity to fix
specific problems within a company. After all, governance terms operate differently at different
companies, and the formal uniformity of typical regulatory conceptions obscures that. 188 DPAs
can supply custom tailored terms that ex ante legislation and administrative rulemaking cannot.
The practice of articulation, moreover, would improve the fit of tailored terms to given
firms. Providing written reasons for decisions tends to improve the quality of decision making, in
most settings. 189 This is one of several values underlying the widespread practice in the U.S. of
judicial opinion writing and in regulatory statements accompanying proposed rulemaking by
administrative agencies. 190 The legal community agrees that such writing improves reasoning,
especially concerning legal decision-making. 191 Prosecutors do not routinely give reasons for
their decisions, but current research indicates that prosecutors believe that articulation of reasons
benefits their decision making too. 192
Evidence from psychological research largely affirms such beliefs. 193 Written rationales
sharpen the reasoning, which improves decision making. It appears to be most effective for
decisions that involve factors that are relatively finite, causal, logical, precise and technical 194—
the characteristics of corporate governance terms. Not all decisions require written reasons, of
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course, and there is no imperative to explain the obvious or to reach for reasons when a decision
is reasonably made on the basis of hunch or intuition—where research suggests writing exercises
can actually be counterproductive. 195 For DPAs, the decision to defer and the fines set may be
respected as products of hunch and intuition whereas the choice of particular substantive
governance terms calls for reason. The articulation practice should thus improve the tailoring of
fit between terms and targets.
Generality. A third factor affecting the relative appeal of conceiving of DPAs as
contractual, regulatory or discretionary concerns how each conception deals with the variety of
prosecutors’ offices in the United States, which vary greatly in many ways. 196 For instance,
institutional differences distinguish federal district offices from state and local offices, with
many state attorneys general having more autonomy than federal counterparts and many local
prosecutors being elected rather than appointed. Caseloads differ, with the Sothern District of
New York handling more corporate matters than the Southern District of Texas, for example.
The relative efficacy of ex ante regulation or ex post judicial or legislative review may diverge
across settings.
All such factors are potentially relevant to defending a conception of DPAs as either
contracts or regulation but, more important, would be relevant to assessing the validity, as a
matter of contract or regulation, of given DPA terms. Relative bargaining power would influence
whether a DPA is best conceived as contract but also whether it is the reasonable product of
volition rather than an unconscionable result of duress. The efficacy of ex ante regulation—say
for local law regulating taxi fleets or liquor sales—would be relevant to evaluating the validity of
a DPA term requiring a corporation to create a chief public safety officer. The relevance of such
factors dissolves when DPAs are appreciated as species of prosecutorial discretion as each
prosecutors’ office exercises discretion in accordance with its unique features and completes the
requested investigation and explanation accordingly. 197
2. Integrated Approach v. Pure Regulation Conception.
Line Drawing. Compared to the pure regulation conception, an advantage of the
integrated approach is overcoming line drawing problems. Under the conception of DPAs as
pure regulation, legislators or prosecutors would have to distinguish between compliance terms,
deemed proper, and governance terms, ruled out-of-bounds. Compliance is a sub-set of
corporate governance but particular devices may evade ready classification. Consider a provision
appointing a chief compliance officer who reports directly to the board, a term composed of both
compliance and governance attributes. More broadly, consider the example of disclosure, which
DPAs invariably require corporations to make: disclosure is an important topic of corporate
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governance, but may be an equally important topic of corporate compliance. Under the
integrated approach, no line drawing is required. 198
Scope of Purposes. Another advantage of the integrated approach compared to the pure
regulation conception concerns the purposes of DPAs. The conception of DPAs as pure
regulation entails not only putting governance terms off-limits but testing the validity of
compliance terms based on their deterrence value, by hypothesizing employee calculations
concerning whether to comply with law or not. 199 But this approach would ignore the recognized
school of thought holding that people comply with law because of norms of obedience that arise
from features of a system that give it legitimacy. 200 Many governance mechanisms fit the bill,
not merely technical compliance devices. 201 Prosecutors speak of achieving rehabilitation aims,
changing corporate culture, from one oriented toward corruption to one embracing compliance,
and governance devices may serve such goals. 202
Better Regulation. Under the pure-regulation conception, ex ante legislation and
administrative rulemaking are preferred to ex post tailoring. Yet one widely recognized problem
with general regulation that occurs following financial crises is the risk of over-reaction amid
widespread psychological and political pressure. 203 True, after scandal, populist backlash against
those perceived to have been at the heart of problems can increase risk of exuberant prosecutorial
enforcement. 204 But such pressures appear less problematic in given DPAs with a particular
company. One reason may be the direct bargaining that occurs between prosecutors and
corporations in the DPA setting compared to the bustle of national politics where lobbyists battle
each other. In any event, the prescribed articulation practice would curb excesses.
Innovative, tailored terms that are explained when adopted could also prove to have value
that could be fruitfully adapted to other firms or even to provide the basis for broadly-applicable
law or rule. Experimentation accompanied by explanation would likely improve the development
of tools that promote deterrence and compliance.
3. Integrated Approach v. Status Quo.
The chief advantages of the integrated approach compared to the status quo concern the
prospect of formalizing, systematizing and cataloguing what has emerged as a spontaneous and
198
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opaque set of practices. DPA practice also appears to be haphazard, although there is evidence
that senior lawyers at the DOJ, at least, are attempting to systematize it.205 That effort supports
the view that the status quo could use improvement. Advantages arise from the proposed practice
of public articulation of the rationales for governance terms included in DPAs. Aside from how
they may improve the quality of decision making as noted earlier, such written rationales are
valuable as precedent and as a source of legitimacy.
Precedent. Precedent is valuable as a resource to guide resolution of future cases in
accordance with kindred treatments of others in previous cases. 206 The articulation practice
would provide a record of the thought process prosecutors and counterparties followed when
coming to agreement on governance terms. Such a system would contribute a base of knowledge
on which prosecutors and corporations could draw in future cases, generating fairness gains akin
to those of stare decisis and efficiency gains by reducing the costs of negotiation and settlement
and increasing the quality of tailoring terms to particular settings.
Legitimacy. Legitimacy, a complex multifaceted concept, encompasses the notion of
justifications for legal decisions. 207 Making such justifications public increases the value of legal
justification. 208 Otherwise, participants and the public may be mystified, confused, and unable to
evaluate the decision fairly. One rationale for published articulation as a source of legitimacy is
the reasoned elaboration provided, demonstrating that a decision is based on more than fiat,
office or position, but principle with a claim to independent respect. 209
Derivative values include creating the capacity for outsiders to assess the reasoning and
its fidelity to prevailing standards and related values such as stare decisis. True, few writings can
provide a comprehensive and faithful account of all reasons, as few judicial opinions do, yet the
exercise constrains discretion to concord with the criterion of legitimacy. 210 Such ability adds the
value of perceived legitimacy, as the public can more confidently accept the judgments of those
who explain themselves under the valence of neutrality than those who act by fiat or demand to
be trusted with power.
The value in the context of DPAs with business organizations seems even more likely to
be pronounced. An authoritative statement of why governance changes are being made would
benefit all corporate constituents—including directors, officers, employees, gatekeepers and
shareholders. In corporate settings where internal communications are part of the governance
apparatus, it may seem odd to employees that such results are not explained by authorities. The
authoritative statement of rationales would communicate institutional resolve, often necessary to
induce employees firm-wide to take governance and compliance measures seriously.
Critique. DPAs produced without explanation expose participants to criticism when the
rationale for particular terms is unclear and open to competing interpretations. Many governance
terms often seem jarring to corporate lawyers and other observers that, if explained in context,
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might be better understood. 211 No doubt, they may seem jarring to employees and others within
the organization with whom they directly deal. With articulations, critics would challenge the
stated rationale of a term rather than the unadorned term as it appears on the face of a contract.
Whatever the reaction, observers would have a firmer foundation to provide criticism—or
praise—when reviewing DPAs.
Prosecutorial Error and Overreach. Current practice leaves no reliable record of
reasoning, one of the important functions of offering public justifications. 212 The AIG case study
is a good example, where despite investigation, through interviews and primary sources, it is
difficult to be certain exactly why certain steps were taken or even when or by whom. 213 A
record from participants would have been intrinsically valuable and checked the risk of
prosecutorial error, a product of the improved decision-making that written reasons offer, and
overreach, a product of their legitimation function. Had Spitzer been compelled to understand
AIG’s governance at the outset, and he and Levitt and others constrained to explain why their
proffered terms made sense for AIG, the risk of oversight and inattention would have been
diminished.
Such an effect would likewise check the risk of prosecutorial overreach. Prosecutors may
be motivated to settle a case using a DPA for a wide variety of reasons. 214 These can be arrayed
along a continuum relating motive to the merits or relative legitimacy. At one end would be the
clearly legitimate avoidance of risks of adverse collateral consequences of organizational
indictment and mitigating concerns over uncertainty of trial and achieving efficient case closure.
Toward the other end are objectives such as bragging rights, which may or may not promote
such valid goals as deterrence and, perhaps at the very end, advancing political objectives in
running for higher office. Whatever the motivations, however, the integrated approach
(investigation and articulation) should channel them toward the legitimate end of the continuum.
Prosecutorial Gains. A special appeal to the interests of prosecutors should not be
ignored. Gains to prosecutors from the articulation practice arise from the overall program of
building a body of valuable knowledge. These benefits are akin to those judges derive from the
practice of opinion writing and regulators from drafting releases for public comment, which
share many of the same objectives—precedent, stare decisis, efficiency, legitimacy, neutrality
and transparency. Such exercises help to expand their authors’ power, especially among branches
of government. 215 Likewise, leadership positions and reputations can be made by publishing
outstanding accounts of decisions. 216
Transparency. Many of the foregoing advantages are particular examples of the broader
feature of transparency that articulation practice would provide. Transparency is valuable for
public acceptability. The public is more likely to accept the practice of legal settlements between
government and corporate defendants when the related terms, including underlying reasons, are
explained. Transparency carries downsides, a cost to those who would prefer to operate behind
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closed doors. Some prosecutors, and perhaps many defense lawyers, may prefer, at least in some
cases, a more opaque process. There can be valid reasons for such a preference, including to
protect the identity of witnesses or whistleblowers or to protect proprietary business matters. 217
Prosecutorial discretion should be maintained for these purposes, while preserving the other
benefits of transparency.
C. Costs and Other Potential Objections
Direct Costs. Few proposals for change are without costs and there are certainly costs
associated with the integrated approach. They should be reasonably low, however, and offset by
the substantial gains from error reduction ex ante and improved effectiveness and other benefits
ex post. As a frame of reference, federal regulations call for the DOJ to conduct a cost-benefit
analysis of any proposal that would likely have an annual impact on the economy of $100
million or more. 218 It does not seem likely that this proposal would entail such high incremental
costs. 219 Nevertheless, a rough cost summary is worth sketching—and should then be compared
to the benefits hypothesized in the previous Section.
The prescribed corporate investigation would require that an additional team of
prosecutors or investigators be dispatched to conduct a governance profile ex ante, and this may
require engaging the assistance of outside experts at some cost. 220 Some of the associated fixed
costs, however, already are incurred in current practice. The investigation involves interviewing
executives or employees and sometimes third parties and reviewing documents. The specific
search for information on corporate practices and structures and extraction of it, as well as
related analysis, would add incremental costs. But preparing a useful profile of even a relatively
large company should be possible with 100 to 300 hours of effort—that incurred to develop the
AIG profile summarized in Part II took far less. Charged at a rate of up to $500 per hour, that
yields approximate costs of no more than $150,000.
During the settlement process, the incremental costs of articulation are more modest.
Under current practice, prosecutors do much of the required work concerning articulation. At the
DPA drafting stage, prosecutors submit work for higher-level approval that would include
memoranda explaining the basis for the agreement and recommendation. Such a practice assures
that prosecutors operate within the agenda of their offices. It does entail additional work but, as
the examples in the next Part of this Article will show, the envisioned articulation exercise is not
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overwhelming. 221 In an analogous context, private plaintiffs’ lawyers settling derivative
shareholder lawsuits based on governance reforms rather than money obtain independent legal
opinions that the reforms confer substantial benefits—an exercise in which law professors are
often engaged at a total cost rarely exceeding $50,000. 222
When weighing costs and benefits, one objection may be that the frequency of
governance terms proffered for DPAs is low compared to the number of investigations opened—
as many investigations close, proceed through prosecution, or are resolved using DPAs that do
not include governance terms. If so, it might follow that costs of ex ante investigation would
arguably be wasted, warranting prosecutors to defer developing requisite rationales until the
DPA stage when it is known that governance terms are to be negotiated. However, the integrated
approach to investigation and reform being proposed includes a prominent role for the
investigation stage, independent of the governance terms in DPAs. The Andersen case makes
clear the importance of considering governance features at the outset, without regard to whether
the topic ever arises in a DPA. The AIG case reinforces that lesson, as prosecutors should have
proceeded with greater caution amid the company’s ongoing governance debate over executive
succession.
A final point about the proposed integrated approach is that incremental costs should not
be so great as to dissuade prosecutors from pursuing DPAs in cases where that is judged to be the
best outcome. After all, DPAs are currently cheap for prosecutors and the proposed integrated
approach would increase their cost. Costs must not be increased so much that DPAs are
abandoned in favor of inferior choices such as the blunt and risky course of indictment. The
concern should be modest, however, as the increased incremental costs, even if high at the
outset, should decline over time as knowledge is developed, precedents built and procedures
standardized. In any event, the effects of the switch might marginally reduce the number of
DPAs over the short term, but their quality would increase with time as well.
Expertise or Competence. A second objection to the integrated approach concerns
prosecutorial expertise or competence. Many prosecutors lack training in corporate governance
and some lack interest. Skeptics might thus wonder about the feasibility of calling for
prosecutors to learn corporate governance, particularly of a large organization. This is a good
objection to the status quo (featuring governance reforms without evident governance
knowledge) but a weak point against the integrated approach. Again, walling off prosecutors
from governance would discourage them from considering important facts ex ante. Further,
while such a learning curve may be steep, it is climbable. The call, after all, is not so much about
broad vague intangible notions of corporate culture but about particular governance attributes
that contribute to defining it and then (a) what their presence says about the probable and
desirable results of steps a prosecutor may consider and (b) what should be changed about them
and why as a condition of settling a case. 223
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Even so, at the DPA negotiation stage, a target board’s and management likely have
greater expertise and knowledge compared to prosecutors concerning governance terms
generally and how they might work at their company. Prosecutors should recognize that and
proceed with a degree of deference, though they do not always appear to do so. The articulation
practice would improve the dialogue and the sense of shared good faith each side brings to the
goal of improving governance. Care is particularly important, however, when settlements are
negotiated with corporate officials after predecessors have been removed and replaced, as in the
case of AIG. Perverse incentives may lead such continuing personnel to amplify concerns in a
bid to cast all blame on outgoing executives. 224
In the end, however, corporate governance is not more sophisticated or inaccessible than
any other peculiar subject with which prosecutors must contend. It is broader than compliance,
but even compliance requires expertise that many prosecutors will not automatically have ahead
of a case where it becomes necessary. Prosecutorial resources will increase with time, moreover,
as prosecutors develop accessible precedents as reservoirs of knowledge. For those prosecutors
unwilling or unable to learn what is required, they can enlist the aid of experts, from among
current or former securities regulators, corporate law or business professors and the like. Caution
must still be exercised, of course, as experts are not immune from mistakes, as the case of AIG
attests, when a prominent former chairman of the SEC prescribed off-the-rack reforms that
backfired due to improper evaluation of the company’s corporate governance profile. 225
Temperament. A variation on the objection about competence or expertise concerns
institutional and personal disposition. Prosecutors may tend to be interested in—and
institutionally directed-toward—punishment, usually via convictions and fines, and adopting an
adversarial outlook. The integrated approach differs, as it embraces a more corporate
transactional-bargaining and creative problem-solving approach. Even were chief prosecutors to
require such exercises, given prosecutors may not be particularly good at them. On the other
hand, the DPA setting marks at least an incremental retreat from the courtroom to the boardroom
and thus a shift in outlook from hostility to settlement. Prosecutors inclined to carry such
adversarial traits into the bargaining process are better advised to enlist the leadership of
prosecutorial colleagues more disposed to the transactional approach to settlement. 226 It is akin to
the shift other disputatious types must undergo when opting for other forms of alternative dispute
resolution. 227
Potency. Even assuming prosecutors embraced the profile exercise and produced the
articulations, there is no way to know how useful they would be. The product relies upon highly
intangible incentives and there is no formal scrutiny. Formal scrutiny could be supplied by
judges, as noted, but that solution, while potentially adding discipline, would also inflate costs
and increase risks of error due to oversight by an individual who may lack expertise and
institutional resources to provide it.
Furthermore, though intangible, prosecutors have their reputations at stake in the
articulation exercise. That may provide a more serious constraint than judicial review, as it
exposes prosecutors to the judgment of their peers and other professional and public
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audiences. 228 In addition, these documents would likely be drafted not solely by prosecutors but
with considerable input from defense counsel resulting in a more meaningful and comprehensive
product. 229
There is some risk that such follow-the-leader practices could simply produce a
boilerplate product but boilerplate is often a sign of optimal contracting. 230 Degenerative
repetition would produce thoughtless boilerplate with prosecutors simply going through the
motions, copying the last DPA memo released. If that were to occur, there would be little in lost
costs along the way, however. It is a typical risk of failure not an objection that should prevent
embracing the proposal.
Window Dressing. A final potential objection is that prosecutorial focus on governance
will simply lead corporations to adopt best practices in name only, akin to how companies go
through the motions of compliance without promoting legal obedience in fact. 231 When
corporations know that prosecutors focus on compliance when evaluating how to proceed with a
case and settle it, a propensity toward compliance window dressing rises. 232 The same concern is
less likely valid concerning governance reforms.
Ex ante, prosecutorial examination of governance features encompasses such intangibles
as the tone at the top and power allocations among officers, directors, employees and
shareholders. Such features, unlike many compliance programs, are difficult to fake. The
creation and maintenance of an employee stock ownership plan, for example, directly affects an
important aspect of governance yet managers are unlikely to be able to manipulate it solely for
cosmetic purposes. Nor can managers as readily manipulate such factors as the concentration of
institutional shareholder ownership, ownership by insiders or employee culture.
On the other hand, prosecutors must avoid the best practices trap that wreaked havoc in
the AIG case. Another example of the problem, which befell the most devoted governance
watchers, is how Enron’s board was named among the best in America 233—just months before
Enron was exposed to be a cipher.
IV. SPECIFIC TERMS AND BRISTOL-MYERS SQUIBB
This Part considers examples of specific governance terms that have appeared or may
appear in DPAs. Examples are drawn from numerous DPAs, including several from the
controversial Bristol-Myers Squibb DPA. 234 Additional details concerning that DPA appear in
the Appendices, excerpting selected governance terms from it followed by prosecutorial
explanations of those terms. The point is to illustrate the feasibility of this Article’s prescription
and some of the immediate benefits apparent from the exercise. It also suggests the value that
might arise from the production of libraries or catalogues of similar articulations. Discussion in
this Section also considers objections to specific terms’ inclusion in DPAs as well as reasoning
228
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to justify such inclusion. 235 These justifications are illustrative of the rationales prosecutors
should publicly provide when including these terms in DPAs.
A. Officers and Directors
It is common for DPAs to call for the termination of employment of particular
individuals, often officers alleged to have been involved in wrongdoing. The AIG case study
provided the ultimate example of such an effort, targeting a CEO. Though common, the DPAs
and accompanying press releases usually reveal little about the rationale of these changes. Critics
oppose allowing DPAs to require such terminations. 236 After all, officers are appointed by
directors, and that appointment is among the most important jobs a board performs. It is
considered an inviolate mandate as seen in criticism of Spitzer for overtly engineering the ouster
of the CEO at Marsh & McLennan 237 and the more covert effort at AIG.
Such ouster would be objectionable when a prosecutor has not made a careful good faith
study of the claims being lodged, as a legal matter. To justify it, prosecutors also should be
willing to explain their actions from a corporate governance perspective. Such judgments must
be based on an investigation, not made before investigation, as was done in AIG’s case. Probable
cause is a concept of criminal procedure relevant to an ex ante determination about whether to
proceed, not the standard for corporate governance ouster, which is a business judgment that
must be based on reliable information not ex ante probabilities. 238
Many DPAs also prescribe specific structural or organizational attributes for certain
officer positions, a topic of corporate governance usually left up to boards. Most commonly,
DPAs require the appointment of particular officers, such as chief compliance officers or chief
risk officers. Some direct particular reporting protocols, such as that the officer may not report to
the CEO or other management but directly to the board or a subset of the board. Prosecutors may
seek to separate the identity of the CEO and chairman. (All these were included in the AIG
prosecution.)
Any or all of these may have a defensible logic in the context of a given company’s
overall corporate governance attributes. It ought to be permissible for prosecutors, so long as
they have demonstrated an understanding of those attributes and articulate a rationale for the
terms, to negotiate for them or even impose them. For example, at Bristol-Myers Squibb,
prosecutors requested that the chairman and CEO positions be split. Although the rationale was
not articulated as part of the agreement when executed, the prosecutors subsequently published a
law review article in which they offered an explanation. 239 It may not be as detailed as one would
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hope, but it reassuringly demonstrates awareness of important issues and a struggle with
balancing trade-offs within the company:
[The traditional structure of having the top leader hold both positions] has
its own benefits and risks: a strong chair/CEO is quite likely a more efficient
structure than splitting the jobs, yet it provides fewer checks and balances. . . .[It
can be valuable to] have an active, experienced non-executive chairman act as an
effective check on the CEO and to insure that the CEO’s office would not act as a
bottleneck for information between the corporate offices and the board of
directors. We believed that this change would enhance the openness and
effectiveness of the governance of Bristol-Myers [Squibb]. Eventually,
management agreed with our assessment. 240
This discussion might have offered additional specific reasons to believe why splitting
the roles would be effective at Bristol-Myers Squibb, both in terms of compliance and
performance. Such explanations should accompany the DPA, not be published afterwards.
Despite such shortcomings, articulation of rationales is unusual, attractive and worthy of
emulation.
The board of directors is at the core of corporate governance entailing many attributes
such as size, qualification, term of office, use of committees and executive sessions. Skeptics
would oppose terms in any of these quintessential topics of corporate governance, though many
DPAs contain such “intrusions.” For example, several have required the board to add one or
more outside directors. 241 In the case of Computer Associates, the DPA named the particular
person who would serve—Laura Unger, a former SEC Commissioner. In at least one case, the
agreement provided for the reinstatement of a particular individual. 242 The addition of numerous
outside directors at AIG was also done in part by prosecutorial instigation.
Some might object that it is unlikely that adding any given number of directors, or filling
the slots with one or more additional outside directors, would have any bearing on a
corporation’s propensity toward compliance with law or add deterrence. 243 But such sweeping
generalities are hard to defend. It is possible that the management directors on a given board
have outsized influence to emphasize risk-taking and err too often on the side of legal violations
and that, had there been just one more outside voice objecting to such a view, a different
atmosphere or culture could develop.
It is even possible, in principle, that an agreement between a prosecutor and corporation
on the designation of a particular person is defensible. 244 That is especially logical in the case of
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a term calling for the reinstatement of a particular individual, as experience provides observable
evidence of probable effectiveness. Of course, one should not have to take it on faith that such
terms are ipso facto legitimate. But prosecutors should be entitled to agree to such terms,
provided they considered governance realities and explain the basis for including them in written
rationales accompanying the DPAs.
DPAs may call for the creation of particular committees, and their various attributes.
Notably, neither federal nor state law requires any corporate board to have committees. 245 The
closest to a mandatory committee arises from Sarbanes-Oxley which sets stringent requirements
for any audit committee that exists and then provides that if there is no separate audit committee
then the stringent requirements apply to the whole board. 246 A similar effect arises from the
Dodd-Frank Act to produce compensation committees. 247 Governance devotees and institutional
shareholders also often seek or endorse the creation of other committees at particular companies,
including governance and nomination committees.
Some DPAs have followed suit. 248 A good example is the DPA with Gen Re, the
Berkshire Hathaway subsidiary at the origin of the AIG case, which required Gen Re’s audit
committee meetings to be attended by an officer of Berkshire Hathaway. 249 There may be a
credible rationale for this: Berkshire, thanks largely to Warren Buffett, exudes corporate
integrity. 250 It had recently acquired Gen Re and found that there was a gap between Berkshire’s
traditional tight internal control environment and looser practices at Gen Re. 251 This is a
quintessential governance issue, both in terms of the implicit knowledge of the need and the
remedy, but with a coherent rationale. The principal defect is that the prosecutor failed to
publicly articulate that rationale.
B. Charitable Giving
Corporate charitable giving is a feature of corporate governance that prosecutors
sometimes use when forming DPAs. 252 Terms usually involve a corporate commitment to
contribute funds to designated organizations. Some critics object to such commitments because,
on their face, they are remote from any agency costs of internal corporate policing. Other critics
see prosecutorial overreaching when they perceive that the charity is one that the prosecutor
personally favors. It is obviously indefensible for a prosecutor to propose terms designed to
might forbid naming any persons or institutions with which anyone in the prosecutors’ office is associated. A
credible middle ground might allow for the corporation to choose from a list that the prosecutors pre-approves
245
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advance personal interests. 253 Such donations may be consistent with the existing corporate
governance or have another defensible purpose, but it is up to the prosecutor to provide the
reasoning and quiet the critics.
Critics often cite the Bristol-Myers Squibb deal as an example of a required donation
amounting to an abuse of prosecutorial discretion. They single out the requirement that the
company endow a chair in legal ethics at Seton Hall University Law School, from which the
prosecuting attorney graduated. 254 But the prosecutors report that the requirement was made in
general terms, to promote ethical training of company executives, and the only restriction was
geographic—that it be done in New Jersey, location of its headquarters. 255 The other law schools
in New Jersey already had a program. Management chose Seton Hall—after the DPA was
done. 256 This explanation negates the charge of parochialism and adds a compliance-oriented
rationale of providing related training to company personnel. 257
An important factor to consider about charitable donations is the relationship between a
company’s existing governance philosophy concerning charitable giving and the donation. Some
companies have a tradition of corporate charitable giving, while others do not, and those
traditions should inform judgments about such terms in DPAs. As examples, companies
including AIG and Berkshire Hathaway historically foreswore using corporate resources for
charitable purposes, both stressing that the boards believed that such allocations were the
prerogative of shareholders. 258 But other corporations, including Bristol-Myers Squibb, follow a
different philosophy and routinely make such contributions. Corporate charitable giving at
Bristol-Myers Squibb included an entire category devoted to professorships and related academic
positions.259 While the DPA was thus consistent with past practice at Bristol-Myers Squibb and
appropriate as a matter of corporate governance there, such a term at AIG or Berkshire Hathaway
would have been inconsistent with their particular practices and therefore inappropriate.
Prosecutors ought to be able to demonstrate at least some logical link between the
corporation and its alleged wrongdoings and the related charitable cause. A doubtful example
appeared in the case of the DPA with Operations Management International. 260 It was alleged to
have violated environmental laws. Its DPA called for it to donate to the Alumni Association of
the Coast Guard Academy to endow a chair in environmental studies. Without an explanation,
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there is no obvious logical connection between the alleged violations and that particular
organization or between the alleged violations and the prospect of improvement.
A similar opacity problem afflicted the DPA with Gibson Guitar Corp. It allegedly
violated the Lacey Act, and foreign laws, restricting the use of certain wood. Gibson allegedly
acquired certain protected wood unlawfully for use in the fingerboards of the guitars it
manufactured. In addition to a fine and compliance commitments, the DPA required the
company to donate $50,000 to the National Fish and Wildlife Federation. 261 Neither the DPA nor
accompanying materials explain the rationale for that donation. There may be a defensible logic
to this but without an explanation critics have an easy target to object to this term. 262
C. Monitors and Consultants
Monitors have theoretical appeal as an oversight mechanism to assure compliance with
the agreed terms of DPAs. 263 Absent some such mechanism, violations could go undetected. Yet
there is also room for abuse, as when cronyism dominates the selection process and additional
agency costs plague the monitors. Critics cite a series of monitor appointments, made without
any bidding process, by the then U.S. Attorney in New Jersey, Christopher Christie, including in
the case of Bristol-Myers Squibb. The DOJ has addressed some of these concerns through
express guidance on the subject but the use of monitors remains of uncertain value. 264
In AIG’s case, a monitor was installed at its financial products division (FP) in late 2004,
a few months before Greenberg resigned. 265 Initially charged with assuring that customers would
not use FP products primarily to massage their books, the assignment gradually expanded over
ensuing years after Greenberg left AIG to encompass broader aspects of FP’s transactions and
internal controls. The monitor spent 2005, 2006, and 2007 submitting to the SEC and
management periodic confidential reports on a wide range of topics in accounting, compliance
and disclosure. AIG paid $20 million for these services. 266 The monitor apparently did not
discover or report to AIG’s board or senior management the brewing problems at FP that
contributed to the financial crisis of 2008. 267 Monitors can be ineffective, despite being costly. 268
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Such failures, along with aversion to accusations of cronyism, may explain why the use
of monitors in DPAs has declined lately. For instance, in the mid-2000s, almost all DPAs
required a monitor whereas in recent years only about one-third do. 269 Other alternatives may
avoid such pitfalls and be more effective for given companies. An exquisite example appears in
the DPA with Gen Re, the Berkshire Hathaway subsidiary. The requirement (noted above) 270
that a Berkshire official attend all Gen Re audit committee meetings installs a functional monitor
employed by the parent company, providing reliable oversight in a logical governance fit.
Many DPAs require a company to hire a consultant charged with recommending
governance changes. Terms often require the company to accept the directives except on the
approval of the governmental authority. Potential changes may be extremely broad and include
any number of provisions addressing every aspect of compliance and all parts of corporate
governance. The AIG DPA had such a clause requiring retaining a consultant and accepting all
changes. 271 That appears to be an enormous vesting of discretion in a person whose authority
would be final and unreviewable by any third party. This is objectionable on prudential grounds.
The call for prosecutorial investigation ex ante and articulation ex post should contribute a sense
of competence to enable prosecutors to curtail that discretion, either by accelerating the reporting
and recommendation phase or actively supervising any consultant that may remain necessary.
D. Shareholders and Disclosure
Another objection to including governance terms in DPAs is that certain terms are of vital
importance to shareholders and over which they should have some say. In accordance with state
corporation law, some of these terms require shareholder approval. One way to address this valid
concern is to broaden the range of corporate governance terms that can be in DPAs to include
shareholder votes for certain terms. This would draw on the usual rules of corporate law for use
in the realm of criminal justice administration. 272
State corporation law usually vests shareholders with voting power over charter
amendments that might define certain board attributes such as size and director election rules. It
may be desirable in some cases to consider shareholder votes on other matters typically within a
board’s discretion, such as committee types, meetings, and attendees; or management, such as
reporting lines. A small number of topics might even require a shareholder vote under federal
law—such as the approval of a company’s outside auditors.
Shareholder voting would both empower shareholders, recognizing their role in corporate
governance that their economic interest affords, and reveal information relevant to prosecutorial
decision making on how to proceed. Giving shareholders such a voice mutes criticism of
unilateral prosecutorial or managerial action. It would also enhance the integrity of the process
and increase the capacity of observers to evaluate the legitimacy of its procedures and the results.
DPAs invariably require a corporate target to provide public disclosure of various kinds.
These routinely include disclosure concerning the circumstances leading to the DPA and related
268
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allegations. Other DPAs call for maintaining enhanced standards relating to disclosure in the
interest of increasing the corporation’s transparency. Disclosure is an integral part of corporate
governance and can also be a stimulant to promote compliance.
Critics have not challenged inclusion of disclosure terms in DPAs and it would be
difficult to sustain such a critique when the disclosure concerns management’s discussion and
analysis of such matters as the DPA’s circumstances and ongoing business operations. As a
matter of corporate governance, however, some restraint is advisable to assure that a DPA’s
disclosure requirements gel with existing corporate practices concerning disclosure, such as the
form and timing of communications to shareholders. Within the framework of securities and
corporate laws concerning disclosure, companies adopt varying stances on how often or how
much detail to supply to shareholders, and scholars debate the optimal level of disclosure. 273
CONCLUSION
Prosecutors targeting corporate defendants may give insufficient consideration to
corporate governance when exercising discretion over how to proceed. Yet such factors are vital
to both the process pursued and settlements reached at the end. They should therefore consider
such variables as shareholder demographics, board orientation, executive reporting, employee
incentives and other factors that bear on how any given formal corporate governance structure
operates. Prosecutors who heed governance at the outset both earn credibility to include such
terms in resolution, and are likelier to propose more effective, narrowly tailored terms. Failure to
investigate first can have devastating consequences, as cases such as Arthur Andersen and AIG
suggest. Investigation and articulation would produce clear benefits, including increased
legitimacy of DPAs ex post, neutralizing criticism aimed at many DPAs.
The DOJ should update its guidelines to encourage prosecutors to consider governance at
the outset and to provide such explanations. Other prosecutorial leaders nationwide should
follow suit. To be sure, this prescription would not necessarily guarantee better outcomes. For
example, had prosecutors taken heed at AIG and viewed the governance realities starkly, they
still may have decided to impose all the changes actually imposed on the grounds that they
judged that such a radical overhaul was necessary. True, but consideration would increase the
chance of desirable outcomes. This problem reflects the challenge of working within a
framework of discretion. There will always be some risk of error. While not guaranteed, this
integrated approach is better than the status quo. After all, had prosecutors studied Andersen in
the prescribed way, a better outcome is highly likely.
In short: the proposal recognizes the proliferation of DPAs as a novel form of corporate
criminal justice administration that would benefit from being formalized, systematized and
catalogued, rather than maintained in the black box of traditional prosecutorial discretion.
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A. Bristol-Myers Squibb Deferred Prosecution Agreement
B. Prosecutors’ Articulations on Bristol-Myers Squibb DPA
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A. Bristol-Myers Squibb Deferred Prosecution Agreement
The following are excerpts from the DPA dated June 15, 2005 between Bristol-Myers
Squibb (“BMS”) and the U.S. Department of Justice, District of New Jersey (referred to as the
“Office”) arising out of alleged accounting violations concerning the timing, measurement and
disclosure of transactions that had the effect of premature recognition of revenue. Appendix B
excerpts prosecutorial explanations, addressing most of the following directly.
5. BMS has undertaken extensive reforms and remedial actions in response to the conduct at BMS
that is and has been the subject of the investigation by the Office. These reforms and remedial actions
have included:
(a) Retaining the Honorable Frederick B. Lacey as Independent Advisor, to conduct a
comprehensive review of the implementation and effectiveness of the internal controls, financial reporting,
disclosure, planning, budget and projection processes and related compliance functions of the Company,
as well as to serve additional supervisory and monitoring functions described herein; . . .
(d) Making significant personnel changes . . . after the Office commenced its investigation
including: (i) replacing the former Chief Financial Officer (CFO); (ii) replacing the former President of the
Worldwide Medicines Group; (iii) replacing the former Controller; (iv) establishing the position of Assistant
Controller for Financial Compliance and Control; (v) establishing the position of Chief Compliance Officer;
(vi) establishing a position for an experienced securities regulation and disclosure lawyer who has a
significant role in all BMS disclosure responsibilities;
(e) Changing its budget process, to assure that appropriate consideration is given to input and
analysis from the bottom to top, and not exclusively from top to bottom, and adequately documenting that
process;
(f) Forming a business risk and disclosure group that includes senior management, the
Independent Advisor and counsel to the Independent Advisor;
(g) Identifying and implementing actions to improve the effectiveness of its disclosure controls and
procedures and internal controls, including enhancing its resources and training with respect to financial
reporting and disclosure responsibilities, and reviewing such actions with its Audit Committee and
independent auditors;
(h) Implementing a formal review and certification process of its annual and quarterly reports filed
with the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC); and
(i) Providing an effective mechanism in the form of a confidential hotline and e-mail address, of
which BMS employees are informed and can use to notify BMS of any concerns about wholesaler inventory
levels or the integrity of the financial disclosures, books and records of BMS. . . .
8. BMS shall establish the position of non-executive Chairman of the BMS Board of Directors (the
“Non-Executive Chairman”), to advance and underscore the Company’s commitment to exemplary
corporate citizenship, to best practices of effective corporate governance and the highest principles of
integrity and professionalism, and to fostering a culture of openness, accountability and compliance
throughout the Company. BMS shall retain the position of Non-Executive Chairman at least throughout the
term of this Agreement.
9. BMS agrees to appoint an additional non-executive Director acceptable to the Office to the BMS
Board of Directors within sixty (60) days of the execution of this Agreement.
10. The Company’s CFO, General Counsel, and Chief Compliance Officer regularly shall brief and
provide information to the Non-Executive Chairman, in a manner to be determined by the Non-Executive
Chairman. In addition, the Non-Executive Chairman shall have the authority to meet with, and require
reports on any subject from, any officer or employee of the Company.
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11. BMS agrees that until at least the date of the filing of the Company’s Form 10-K for the year
ended 2006, it will retain an outside, independent individual or entity (the “Monitor”), selected by BMS and
approved by the Office. BMS may employ as the Monitor the Honorable Frederick B. Lacey. It shall be a
condition of the Monitor’s retention that the Monitor is independent of BMS and that no attorney-client
relationship shall be formed between the Monitor and BMS.
12. The Monitor shall: (a) Monitor BMS’s compliance with this Agreement, and have authority to
require BMS to take any steps he believes are necessary to comply with the terms of this Agreement; (b)
Continue the review, reforms and other functions undertaken as the Independent Advisor; (c) Report to the
Office, on at least a quarterly basis and between thirty and forty-five calendar days after the filing of the
Company’s Form 10-K for the year ended 2006, as to BMS’s compliance with this Agreement and the
implementation and effectiveness of the internal controls, financial reporting, disclosure processes and
related compliance functions of the Company. . . . (d) Cooperate with the SEC and provide information
about BMS as requested by that agency; (e) Monitor BMS’s compliance with applicable federal securities
laws, and in his quarterly reports make recommendations necessary to ensure that the Company complies
with applicable federal securities laws; . . .
13. BMS agrees that the Chief Executive Officer (CEO), Non-Executive Chairman, and General
Counsel will meet quarterly with the Office and the Monitor, in conjunction with the Monitor’s quarterly
reports.
14. BMS shall adopt all recommendations contained in each report submitted by the Monitor to the
Office unless BMS objects to the recommendation and the Office agrees that adoption of the
recommendation should not be required. The Monitor’s reports to the Office shall not be received or
reviewed by BMS prior to submission to the Office; such reports will be preliminary until senior
management of BMS is given the opportunity, within ten (10) days after the submission of the report to the
Office, to comment to the Monitor and the Office in writing upon such reports, and the Monitor has reviewed
and provided to the Office responses to such comments, upon which such reports shall be considered final.
...
17. The Non-Executive Chairman and the Compensation Committee of the Board of Directors shall
set goals and objectives relevant to compensation of the CEO, evaluate the CEO’s performance in light of
those goals and objectives, and recommend to the Board of Directors compensation based on this
evaluation.
18. BMS agrees that it will establish and maintain a training and education program, which shall be
reviewed and approved by the Board of Directors, designed to advance and underscore the Company’s
commitment to exemplary corporate citizenship, to best practices of effective corporate governance and the
highest principles of integrity and professionalism, and to fostering a culture of openness, accountability
and compliance throughout the Company. . . . The Board of Directors shall communicate to the Mandatory
Participants, in writing or by video, its review and endorsement of the training and education program. . . .
20. BMS shall endow a chair at Seton Hall University School of Law dedicated to the teaching of
business ethics and corporate governance, which position shall include conducting one or more seminars
per year on business ethics and corporate governance at Seton Hall University School of Law that
members of BMS’s executive and management staff, along with representatives of the executive and
management staffs of other companies in the New Jersey area, may attend. . . .
22. Within thirty (30) days of the execution of this Agreement, BMS agrees to call a meeting, on a
date mutually agreed upon by BMS and the Office, of its senior executives and any senior financial
personnel, and any other BMS employees who the Company desires to attend, such meeting to be
attended by the United States Attorney and other representatives of the Office for the purpose of
communicating the goals and expected effect of this Agreement.
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23. For a period of one year from the execution of this Agreement, the Non-Executive Chairman,
CEO, and General Counsel shall contemporaneously monitor either in person or telephonically BMS’s
quarterly conference calls for analysts (“analyst calls”), and the Non-Executive Chairman shall attend and
participate in any preparatory meetings held among the CEO, the CFO, the General Counsel and other
members of BMS senior management in anticipation of the analyst calls. The General Counsel shall ensure
that representatives of the BMS legal division are informed and consulted regarding, at a minimum, issues
relating to disclosure or securities law that may arise in the course of preparing for the analyst calls.
24. The CEO and CFO shall prepare and submit to the Non-Executive Chairman, Chief
Compliance Officer and the Monitor described in paragraph 11 written reports on the following subjects: (a)
all non-standard transactions with major U.S. wholesalers, such written report to be submitted within fifteen
(15) days of such transaction; (b) an overview and analysis of BMS’s annual budget process for its major
business units, including description of significant instances of any top-down changes to business unit
submissions, such written report to be submitted together with the proposed budget submitted for approval
to the Board of Directors; (c) sales and earnings forecasts or projections at the corporate or major business
unit level which indicate a quarterly target will not be met, together with a description of steps subsequently
taken, if any, to achieve the budget target, such written report to be submitted quarterly and at least ten
(10) business days prior to the Company’s scheduled quarterly analyst call; d) description of significant
instances in which the preliminary quarterly closing of the books of any major business unit indicated that
the business unit would not meet its budget target for any sales or earnings measure.
25. BMS agrees that it shall include in its quarterly and annual public filings with the SEC and its
annual report to shareholders financial disclosures concerning the following: (a)(i) for the Company’s U.S.
Pharmaceuticals business, estimated wholesaler/direct-customer inventory levels of the top fifteen (15)
products sold by such business and (ii) for major non-U.S. countries, estimated aggregate
wholesaler/direct-customer inventory levels of the top fifteen (15) pharmaceutical products sold in such
countries taken as a whole measured by aggregate annual sales in such countries; (b) arrangements with
and policies concerning wholesalers/direct customers and other distributors of such products, including but
not limited to efforts by BMS to control and monitor wholesaler/distributor inventory levels; (c) data
concerning prescriptions or other measures of end-user demand for such top fifteen (15) BMS
pharmaceutical products sold within the U.S. and in major non-U.S. countries; (d) acquisition, divestiture,
and restructuring reserve policies and activity; and (e) rebate accrual policies and activity. The CEO shall,
at the annual BMS shareholder meeting, report to the shareholders on these topics.
26. BMS agrees that it will continue to review and improve, where necessary, the content of its
public financial and non-financial public disclosures, including periodic SEC filings, annual and other
shareholder reports, press releases, and disclosures during analyst conference calls, as well as during
meetings with investors and credit ratings agencies. BMS agrees that it will at all times strive for openness
and transparency in its public reporting and disclosures.
27. BMS shall encourage the free flow of information between its employees and its external
auditor, and encourage its CFO and senior finance personnel to seek advice from the external auditor. The
CEO, CFO, General Counsel, and Chief Compliance Officer shall meet quarterly with the Company’s
external auditors, such meeting to occur following the closing of the Company’s books for the quarter and
prior to the Company’s scheduled quarterly analyst call. At the quarterly meeting, the BMS attendees shall
discuss business and financial reporting developments, issues and trends with the external auditor, as well
as provide information to the external auditor concerning the subjects described in paragraph 24 above,
and shall respond to inquiries from the external auditor.
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B. Prosecutors’ Articulations on Bristol-Myers Squibb DPA
The following are excerpts from the law review article, published in 2006, by prosecutors
in the case of Bristol-Myers Squibb (“BMS”) explaining some of the governance terms of the
DPA excerpted in Appendix A. 274 Far from perfect and perhaps not even optimal, it illustrates
the relative ease of the exercise and suggests the potential value of articulations that, together,
furnish considerable systemic benefits. The article also explained some of the background of the
investigation, including highlights of the company’s governance profile reflecting a degree of ex
ante consideration of important factors.
One issue we faced was how to reverse Bristol-Myers’ failures to disclose facts underlying its
channel stuffing, accruals for rebates, and manipulation of reserves. The deferred prosecution agreement
deals with the most obvious aspect of this problem by mandating specific disclosures in Bristol-Myers’
public filings with the SEC and its annual report to shareholders [quoting ¶25 as follows]:
Bristol-Myers agrees that it shall include in its quarterly and annual public filings with the
SEC and its annual report to shareholders financial disclosures concerning the following:
(a)(i) for the Company’s U.S. Pharmaceuticals business, estimated wholesaler/directcustomer inventory levels of the top fifteen (15) products sold by such business and (ii)
for major non-U.S. countries, estimated aggregate wholesaler/direct-customer inventory
levels of the top fifteen (15) pharmaceutical products sold in such countries taken as a
whole measured by aggregate annual sales in such countries; (b) arrangements with and
policies concerning wholesalers/direct customers and other distributors of such products,
including but not limited to efforts by Bristol-Myers to control and monitor
wholesaler/distributor inventory levels; (c) data concerning prescriptions or other
measures of end-user demand for such top fifteen (15) Bristol-Myers pharmaceutical
products sold within the U.S. and in major non-U.S. countries; (d) acquisition, divestiture,
and restructuring reserve policies and activity; and (e) rebate accrual policies and
activity. The CEO shall, at the annual Bristol-Myers shareholder meeting, report to the
shareholders on these topics.
Requiring specific disclosures, however, is somewhat akin to treating the symptoms of a disease
and not its causes. Therefore, we sought a more fundamental change in Bristol-Myers’ attitude toward the
investing public. To that end, the deferred prosecution agreement [in ¶26] includes Bristol-Myers’
commitment “that it will at all times strive for openness and transparency in its public reporting and
disclosures” and “that it will continue to review and improve, where necessary, the content of its public
financial and non-financial public disclosures, including periodic SEC filings, annual and other shareholder
reports, press releases, and disclosures during analyst conference calls, as well as during meetings with
investors and credit ratings agencies.”
The deferred prosecution agreement also calls for Bristol-Myers to utilize the expertise of its
outside auditors on disclosure and accounting matters [quoting ¶27 as follows]:
Bristol-Myers shall encourage the free flow of information between its employees and its
external auditor, and encourage its CFO and senior finance personnel to seek advice
from the external auditor. The CEO, CFO, General Counsel, and Chief Compliance
Officer shall meet quarterly with the Company’s external auditors . . . prior to the
274
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Company’s scheduled quarterly analyst call. At the quarterly meeting, the Bristol-Myers
attendees shall discuss business and financial reporting developments, issues and
trends with the external auditor, as well as provide information to the external auditor
concerning the subjects described in paragraph 24, and shall respond to inquiries from
the external auditor.
By including provisions relating to transparency, our intent was to address both specific failings
uncovered in the investigation and an equally disturbing corporate culture that favored secrecy over
openness. For example, by requiring regular quarterly meetings among senior management and their
independent auditors, our expectation is that if future law breaking were to occur, it would be much more
difficult for top management and the auditors to claim ignorance. The goal is that Bristol-Myers should
report all material facts, good and bad, to the investing public. With respect to unfavorable news, BristolMyers must get into the habit of disclosure, not concealment; if there is a question about whether or not to
disclose something, the deferred prosecution agreement clearly calls for more information, not less.
Perhaps the most difficult issue to address in this matter was reforming Bristol-Myers’ corporate
governance in ways that would give some assurance that the failures [we found] would not be repeated. At
the very least, Bristol-Myers’ remaining top management failed to detect and prevent the wrongdoing [we
found]. Yet federal prosecutors must tread warily in the area of corporate governance. Plainly, federal
prosecutors have no business telling corporate executives what business judgments to make or otherwise
intruding into business decisions. It was clear to us, however, that Bristol-Myers’ board of directors and top
executives had to be more involved in governing the company and therefore more accountable to all its
stakeholders. This greater involvement of top management, together with a healthy dose of outside
oversight, would provide confidence that Bristol-Myers will not repeat past sins.
Bristol-Myers, like many U.S. companies, had historically allowed its top leader to hold both
positions of chairman of the board of directors and chief executive officer (CEO). This structure
undoubtedly has its own benefits and risks: a strong chair/CEO is quite likely a more efficient structure than
splitting those jobs, yet it provides fewer checks and balances. We determined there were three options to
deal with the failure of the CEO and the board of directors to address the wrongdoing that occurred on their
watch. The first was to leave the governance structure intact and hope the other provisions of the deferred
prosecution agreement (along with the presence of the federal monitor) would solve the problem. The
second alternative was to demand the resignation of the chairman and CEO for failure to discover and
address the wrongdoing. The third was a hybrid of the first two options, which was formulated during
negotiations with corporate counsel. The reasoning behind this provision was two-fold: to have an active,
experienced non-executive chairman act as an effective check on the CEO; and to insure that the CEO’s
office would not act as a bottleneck for information between the corporate officers and the board of
directors. We believed this change would enhance the openness and effectiveness of the governance of
Bristol-Myers. Eventually, management agreed with our assessment.
The Bristol-Myers deferred prosecution agreement requires the company to split the roles of board
chair and chief executive [quoting ¶8]:
Bristol-Myers shall establish the position of non-executive Chairman of the Bristol-Myers
Board of Directors (the “Non-Executive Chairman”), to advance and underscore the
Company’s commitment to exemplary corporate citizenship, to best practices of effective
corporate governance and the highest principles of integrity and professionalism, and to
fostering a culture of openness, accountability and compliance throughout the Company.
Bristol-Myers shall retain the position of Non-Executive Chairman at least throughout the
term of this Agreement.
This approach, we feel, provides maximum board involvement in and accountability for BristolMyers’ business decisions, including its public disclosures. The deferred prosecution agreement
57

deliberately avoids any temptation to micro-manage the role of the non-executive chairman. Instead, it sets
forth aspirational goals for the company and mandates information sharing with the non-executive
chairman. [The article here quotes ¶10.] It also gives the non-executive chairman a limited role in preparing
for and monitoring quarterly conference calls with Wall Street analysts and investors. [The article here
quotes ¶23.] The Board selected James D. Robinson III, a long-time Bristol-Myers Director, to fill this role.
In addition to splitting the roles of board chair and chief executive, the deferred prosecution
agreement also requires Bristol-Myers to appoint an additional non-executive Director acceptable to the
U.S. Attorney’s Office. Our aim was to bring fresh blood and a new perspective to the board of directors;
our preference for someone with a law enforcement background was made clear. Accordingly, BristolMyers selected, and the U.S. Attorney’s Office approved, Louis J. Freeh, a former federal judge, federal
prosecutor, and Director of the FBI, as the additional director.
Our conclusions regarding these governance issues were informed by meetings with both the CEO
and the entire board of directors. The U.S. Attorney, along with the other prosecutors on the investigation,
met a number of times with the CEO. One of the purposes of these meetings was to gain insight into the
way management actually worked at Bristol-Myers. That knowledge helped us to intelligently and
comprehensively negotiate a deferred prosecution agreement that dealt with the real problems at BristolMyers. The CEO gave us a real insider’s view of how these events unfolded from his perspective.
We questioned the CEO regarding his relationship with his other senior officers, the board of
directors, and his external auditors. We were attempting to find out every detail we could as to why the
governance structures at Bristol-Myers had failed. By the very nature of the questions, these conversations
were at times contentious. We discovered, however, that one of the root causes of the failures was the lack
of timely and relevant information reaching all the decision makers at the top of the corporate chain of
command. This led us to the conclusion that alternative information pipelines had to be opened in addition
to the pipeline into the CEO’s office. This further reinforced our conviction that the splitting of the chairman
and CEO positions was a good idea.
Once we decided that the separation of the chairman and CEO’s position was advisable, we felt
that a meeting with the entire board of directors was necessary. We traveled to a regularly scheduled board
meeting in Wilmington, Delaware and engaged in a ninety-minute open exchange with the Board. It was an
opportunity to discuss previous conduct, and our ideas for future remediation, with the board. The Board
shared with us their concerns about a deferred prosecution agreement and the potential effect on their
business plans. Most importantly, we were able to gauge the commitment of the Board to real change in
governance. The meeting also gave us the chance to assess each board member in light of our desire to
potentially find a non-executive chairman who had a deep knowledge of Bristol-Myers and a real desire to
be an agent of change of the corporate culture, which created these issues in the first place.
These corporate governance changes, along with the other governance measures Bristol-Myers
adopted prior to the deferred prosecution agreement are no guarantee of perfectly smooth sailing during
the term of the agreement. Regardless, this increased internal accountability should go a long way toward
achieving the goal of good corporate citizenship. We believed, however, that more was needed from
outsiders to insure compliance with the agreement and a change in corporate culture.
The maxim “trust but verify” applies in deferred prosecution agreements. From the prosecutor’s
point of view, it would be highly irresponsible to allow a corporation whose prosecution is being deferred to
go unsupervised during the deferral period. Bristol-Myers, to its credit, recognized at the inception of the
investigation, and long before we began to negotiate the terms of the deferred prosecution agreement, that
outside help would benefit the company. The company retained as an independent advisor the Honorable
Frederick B. Lacey, a former U.S. Attorney and federal judge in the District of New Jersey, and gave him a
broad mandate to review the company’s internal controls, financial reporting, disclosure, compliance, and
budget processes. We requested, and Bristol-Myers agreed, to expand Judge Lacey’s role to become the
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independent federal monitor at Bristol-Myers.
The independent monitor has wide authority to oversee Bristol-Myer’s compliance with the deferred
prosecution agreement and strengthen its ongoing remediation efforts. [The DPA at ¶12] charges the
monitor to perform the following tasks, among others:
(a) Monitor Bristol-Myers’ compliance with this Agreement, and have authority to require
Bristol-Myers to take any steps he believes are necessary to comply with the terms of this
Agreement; (b) Continue the review, reforms and other functions undertaken as the
Independent Advisor; (c) Report to the Office, on at least a quarterly basis . . . as to
Bristol-Myers’ compliance with this Agreement and the implementation and effectiveness
of the internal controls, financial reporting, disclosure processes and related compliance
functions of the Company; (d) Monitor Bristol-Myers’ compliance with applicable federal
securities laws, and in his quarterly reports make recommendations necessary to ensure
that the Company complies with applicable federal securities laws.
The monitor’s power is also significantly bolstered by his authority to make recommendations that
Bristol-Myers must adopt “unless Bristol-Myers objects to the recommendation and the Office agrees that
adoption of the recommendation should not be required.” A strong, independent monitor is in a far better
position to ride herd over a mammoth corporation than any U.S. Attorney’s Office or Probation Office.
Independent monitors are visible, on-site reminders that compliance with the terms of a deferred
prosecution agreement is mandatory, not optional. Monitors are able to observe and understand the
business they oversee, along with its personnel and processes, in ways that federal prosecutors never
could or should. If the company views their monitor as a force for positive change and not as an unwanted
burden, all sides benefit.
The central role of Judge Lacey in ensuring successful adherence to the spirit and letter of the
deferred prosecution agreement by no means ends the role of the U.S. Attorney’s Office in this matter. The
agreement makes it clear that all participants—Bristol-Myers, the independent monitor, and the U.S.
Attorney’s Office—should treat the agreement as an opportunity to work together toward the common aim
of making Bristol-Myers a model corporate citizen. The agreement provides for regular communication
among the parties, requiring Bristol-Myers’ CEO, non-executive chairman, and general counsel to meet
quarterly with the U.S. Attorney’s Office and the monitor. [¶13] The quarterly meetings are an opportunity
to discuss the monitor’s quarterly reports and any other issues and concerns that may arise, to keep the
lines of communication open, and to remind all of the importance of compliance with the agreement and the
serious consequences breach of the agreement would have for the company, its shareholders, and
employees.
The regular quarterly meetings have already proven to be useful and interesting. Prior to each
meeting, we are provided with a 400-500 page quarterly progress report by the independent monitor. The
report provides updates on Bristol-Myers’ business operations, new legal issues arising in any of its
operating entities, compliance with the deferred prosecution agreement, and a forward-looking section on
issues Bristol-Myers will confront in the next quarter. We also exchange draft agendas prior to meeting so
that all topics of interest to both parties are addressed. The attendees at the meeting include the nonexecutive chairman, the chief executive officer, the general counsel, the U.S. Attorney, his counsel, and the
Assistant U.S. Attorneys who prosecuted the matter. The independent monitor presides at the meeting. To
further emphasize the post-deferred prosecution agreement sense of partnership between the parties, the
site of the meeting is alternated between our offices and [those of] Bristol-Myers. . . .
In addition, to impress upon Bristol-Myers’ top managers and finance personnel the seriousness of
the company’s situation, the deferred prosecution agreement also provides [in ¶22] for “a meeting . . . of its
senior executives and any senior financial personnel, and any other Bristol-Myers employees who the
Company desires to attend, such meeting to be attended by the United States Attorney and other
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representatives of the Office for the purpose of communicating the goals and expected effect of this
Agreement.” . . .
The deferred prosecution agreement recognized that Bristol-Myers had taken steps to change its
budget process, to assure that appropriate consideration is given to input and analysis from the bottom to
top, and not exclusively from top to bottom, and to adequately document that process. The agreement
requires that Bristol-Myers management keep informed about its budget process and the perils of top-down
budgeting, but does leave budgeting to Bristol-Myers management. [The DPA at ¶24] provides for highlevel reporting on issues that will reflect whether the old culture of hitting the numbers at all costs still
lingers. It provides as follows:
The CEO and CFO shall prepare and submit to the Non-Executive Chairman, Chief
Compliance Officer and the Monitor described in paragraph 11 written reports on the
following subjects: (a) all non-standard transactions with major U.S. wholesalers, such
written report to be submitted within fifteen (15) days of such transaction; (b) an overview
and analysis of Bristol-Myers’ annual budget process for its major business units, including
description of significant instances of any top-down changes to business unit submissions,
such written report to be submitted together with the proposed budget submitted for
approval to the Board of directors; (c) sales and earnings forecasts or projections at the
corporate or major business unit level which indicate a quarterly target will not be met,
together with a description of steps subsequently taken, if any, to achieve the budget
target, such written report to be submitted quarterly and at least ten (10) business days
prior to the Company’s scheduled quarterly analyst call; (d) description of significant
instances in which the preliminary quarterly closing of the books of any major business unit
indicated that the business unit would not meet its budget target for any sales or earnings
measure.
The agreement [¶18] also requires Bristol-Myers to develop and implement a “training and
education program, which shall be reviewed and approved by the board of directors, designed to advance
and underscore the Company’s commitment to exemplary corporate citizenship, to best practices of
effective corporate governance and the highest principles of integrity and professionalism, and to fostering
a culture of openness, accountability and compliance throughout the Company.” . . .
Many of the remedial measures in the deferred prosecution agreement—the top-level structural
and governance changes, the reporting by senior management, and the training and education programs
for key financial and legal personnel—are designed to spread knowledge and responsibility for doing the
right thing throughout the Bristol-Myers organization.
[The following paragraph appeared as footnote 29 in the article, addressing ¶29 of the DPA.]
Another step taken by Bristol-Myers to try to change the corporate culture was the endowment of a chair in
business ethics at Seton Hall University School of Law. The professor occupying that endowed chair is
required to conduct an annual ethics seminar for Bristol-Myers management and other interested industry
members. The idea for endowing the chair originated with counsel for Bristol-Myers. The only requirement
from our Office was that the chair was endowed at a New Jersey law school. Rutgers University School of
Law already had a chair in business ethics endowed by Prudential. Bristol-Myers, after the signing of the
deferred prosecution agreement, entered into discussions with the Dean of Seton Hall Law School and
formally endowed the chair in December 2005.
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